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O'Dell v. Netherland: A Bedrock Principal of
Fundamental Fairness?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Some of the jurors were wanting to know would he get out in
like seven years on good behavior ....

If we were gonna put

him in prison, we wanted to make sure he would stay there. But
•.. we didn't really feel like he would ....

We really felt like we

didn't have any alternative.'

The preceding quote made by a juror in an interview following a
death verdict imposed on a defendant2 illustrates jurors' frustration
with the lack of alternatives to capital punishment. Several states
began providing a life-without-parole alternative to the death penalty.3
Despite providing this alternative, some of these states failed to inform
juries of this life-without-parole option.4 Regardless of this
alternative, some prosecutors still argued that a defendant should
receive a death sentence because, in the absence of such a sentence, he
or she would pose a future danger to society.5 In some of these cases,
the defendant was prohibited from rebutting that concern by offering
evidence to show his or her parole ineligibility.6
In 1994, the Supreme Court held in Simmons v. South Carolina7

that where the prosecution promotes a death sentence by arguing that
the defendant presents a future danger to society, the defendant may
rebut this assertion by offering evidence that he or she is parole
ineligible.8 The Simmons decision came down as Joseph O'Dell sat

1. See Richard C. Dieter, Sentencing for Life: Americans Embrace Alternatives to the
Death Penalty (last modified Mar. 1, 1998) <http://www.essential.org/dpic/
dpic.r07.html>.
2. See id.
3. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 167 n.7 (1994) (stating that "there
are 26 States that both employ juries . . . and provide for life imprisonment without
parole as an alternative to capital punishment").
4. See id. at 168 n.8. Those states were Pennsylvania, South Carolina, and Virginia.

See id.
5.
6.
7.
8.

See, e.g., id. at 157-58; O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1972 (1997).
See, e.g., Simmons, 512 U.S. at 157-58; O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1972.
512 U.S. 154 (1994).
See id. at 178.
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on death row. 9 In O'Dell v. Netherland,0 the prosecution made that
same argument as a means of ensuring that O'Dell receive a death
sentence, as opposed to a life-in-prison term.' Like the defendant in
Simmons, at the time of his sentencing hearing, O'Dell was not
permitted to offer evidence of his parole ineligibility to rebut the
prosecution's argument. 2 Upon learning of the Simmons decision,
Joseph O'Dell sought to apply the rule retroactively in an effort to
upset his death sentence.' 3 Taking his plea all the way to the Supreme
Court, O'Dell walked away a loser.' 4 In O'Dell,5 the Supreme Court
concluded that, as per the Teague doctrine, 6 the Simmons rule17could
not be applied retroactively to overturn O'Dell's death sentence.
This Note analyzes the Supreme Court's decision in O'Dell and
addresses the impact that the decision will have on future habeas
corpus petitioners. First, this Note summarizes the history and
development of capital sentencing procedures 8 and the establishment
of rules regarding the introduction of evidence in sentencing and postsentencing capital punishment cases.' 9 Further, this Note reviews the
retroactive application of rules to habeas petitions, both before and
after Teague v. Lane.20 This Note then discusses the facts of O'Dell,2'
along with the majority 22 and dissenting opinions. 23 Although this
Note applauds the majority for treating Simmons as a "new" rule under
the Teague doctrine, 24 it criticizes the majority for failing to apply the
rule retroactively to O'Dell as a "bedrock procedural element" under
9. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1971-72.
10. 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997).
11. See id. at 1972.
12. See id.
13. See id.
14. See id. at 1979. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit that the new Simmons rule could not be
retroactively apply to O'Dell. Id.
15. 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997).
16. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see also infra Part II.C (discussing
whether new rules of criminal procedure should be applied retroactively).
17. O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978 (stating that the Simmons rule is new and that O'Dell
may not invoke it unless it falls within one of the Teague doctrine exceptions).
18. See infra Part II.A.
19. See infra Part 1I.B.
20. See infra Part II.C.
21. See infra Part III.A.
22. See infra Part III.B.
23. See infra Part III.C.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. Teague, 489 U.S. at 315.
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Teague's second exception.26 Finally this Note advocates that,
because applying Teague's second exception narrowly to death penalty
petitioners violates the criminal system's fundamental principles of
justice, the Supreme Court should adopt a broader approach for death
penalty cases. 27

II. BACKGROUND
Given the severity of capital punishment, courts and legislatures
have established extensive procedural safeguards and a lengthy appeals
route for defendants sentenced to death.2 8 Further, complex
evidentiary rules govern both sentencing and post-sentencing death
penalty cases. 29 Due to the length of time that a defendant sits on death
row, it is likely that a procedural rule will come down that could assist
his or her case. 30 Thus, the defendant will seek to retroactively apply
the new rule through application of the Teague doctrine-a
doctrine that
31
governs the retroactive application of new rules.
A. Death Penalty Sentences
As of February, 1997, 3,365 people were residents of "death
row"32 in the United States.33 Because no penalty for wrongdoing is
as severe and permanent as the death penalty,34 the controversy over
26. See infra Part IV.B.
27. See infra Part V.
28. See infra Part II.A.
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.C.
31. See infra Part II.C.
32. "Death row" is a separate area in prisons for those who have been sentenced to
death. See Amnesty International, Proposal for a Presidential Commission on the Death
Penalty in the United States of America, reprinted in HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH
PENALTY IN AMERICA 375, 379 (3d ed. 1982) (stating "[pirisoners under sentence of death
wait there, often in isolation and under special deprivations and restraints, until the hour
of their execution").
33. See Death Penalty Information Center, (last modified Mar. 1, 1998)
<http://www.essential.org/dpic/dpic5.html>; see also David I. Bruck, Decisions of
Death, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 12, 1983 (rev. 1995), reprinted in RANDALL COYNE & LYN
ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 55 (1994) (noting that "[i]f
death row were really a row [in 1995], it would [have] stretch[ed] for more than [three]
miles, cell after six-foot-wide cell").
34. See Ernest van den Haag, The Ultimate Punishment: A Defense, 99 HARV. L. REV.
1662, 1662 (1986). Van den Haag stated: "The death penalty is our harshest
punishment. It is irrevocable: it ends the existence of those punished . . .[and] is the
only corporal punishment still applied to adults." Id.
Hanging, firing squad, electric chair, gas chamber, and lethal injection constitute the
five available methods of capital punishment in the United States. See Jacob Weisberg,
This Is Your Death, THE NEW REPUBLIC, July 1, 1991, at 23.
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capital punishment continues to rage.35 Given the high stakes involved
in sentencing a human being to death and the serious consequences
caused by any error in death sentencing, in 1968, the Supreme Court
began to take an active role in assuring that death sentencing
procedures meet Constitutional requirements.36
1. Procedural Safeguards in Death Sentencing
Before 1968, the Supreme Court did not grant certiorari to any case
concerning the constitutionality of a defendant's death sentence.37
However, the landmark case of Furman v. Georgia38 introduced the
Supreme Court's commitment, in the early 1970s, to creating
additional procedural safeguards in death sentencing cases.3 9 In
Furman, the Supreme Court overturned every state's death penalty
law, releasing every prisoner on death row 4° on the basis that jurydiscretionary selection of criminals sentenced to death was random and
arbitrary. 4 ' Although the Furman Court did not decide the issue of
whether any capital sentencing statute could meet constitutional
35. See, e.g., Betsy Hart, Conversion No Cause to Spare Murderers' Lives,
MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, Feb. 9, 1998, at 10 (rejecting the argument that conversion is

cause to overturn a death sentence); Deborah Mathis, Death Penalty Halts Steps Toward
Enlightenment, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 9, 1998, at 7a (analyzing the conflict
surrounding capital punishment); Jonathan Roos, House GOP Leaders Shelve DeathPenalty Efforts for '98, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 13, 1998, at 3A (reporting the
controversy in Iowa regarding the failed attempt to restore the state's death penalty law
repealed thirty-three years ago); Mike Ward, Officials Stand Up for Death Penalty,
AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Feb. 5, 1998, at Al (examining Texas officials' continued
support for the death penalty after Karla Faye Tucker's execution); Tony Wharton, With
Plea to Spare Woman, Robertson Breaks a Pattern;Some Pleased,Others Enragedthat He
Says this Killer Should Live, VIRGINIAN PILOT & LEDGER-STAR, Jan. 11, 1998, at Al
(discussing the Karla Faye Tucker controversy).
36. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In Witherspoon, the Court
refused to uphold a death sentence imposed by a jury, which at the time of its selection,
excluded all jurors who voiced general objections to capital punishment or expressed
conscientious or religious problems with capital punishment. See id. at 521-22; see
also WELSH S. WHITE, THE DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE
MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 4 (1991) (discussing the change in the Court's

mindset regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty and the culmination of that
change in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972)).
Death penalty sentences are often challenged by either the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment, or the Fourteenth Amendment's due
process requirement. See RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND
THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 91 (1994).
37. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 4.
38. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). Furman was a five-to-four decision, with all nine Justices
writing separate opinions. See id. at 240.
39. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 4.
40. See Bruck, supra note 33, at 57.
41. See id.; WHITE, supra note 36, at 4.
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muster,42 in the years following Furman,the Court held that, although
capital punishment was not per se unconstitutional, states were
required to ensure fairness and consistency in their death penalty
systems.43
Thus, the Court steadily mandated additional substantive and
procedural safeguards before subjecting a defendant to capital
punishment.' The Court has struck down mandatory death sentences,
encouraging individualized sentencing. 45 In contrast, it has upheld
both death penalty laws that incorporate sentencing guidelines and jury
consideration of the specific crime and the defendant's character. ' In
the late 1970s and early 1980s, the Court began to require that the jury
consider any mitigating evidence, such as a defendant's character and
record, and the circumstances surrounding the defendant's crime.47
The Court also encouraged a limitation on the use of aggravating
42. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring); see also WHITE, supra note
36, at 4 (discussing that each of the nine Justices wrote separate opinions in Furman).
Five Justices concurred on the "core basis ... that the death penalty had been applied so
capriciously as to violate the Eighth Amendment." WHITE, supra note 36, at 4.
43. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's death penalty
statute that narrowed the class of defendants subject to the death penalty, permitted jury
consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and provided for automatic
appeal); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976) (holding that Florida's revised death
penalty statute satisfied the Furman test against arbitrary and capricious imposition of
the death penalty); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (upholding Texas' post-Furman
death penalty statute). But see Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976)
(finding North Carolina's revised death penalty statute unconstitutional); Roberts v.
Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325 (1976) (invalidating Louisiana's post-Furman death penalty
statute).
Within four years after the Court's decision in Furman, 35 states enacted revised death
penalty statutes. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 155. The following states currently have death
penalty statutes: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana,
Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, Mew Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 33, at
<http://www.essential.org/dipc/dpic l.html>.
44. See generally WHITE, supra note 36, at 4-25 (discussing the Court's role in
creating more stringent procedural safeguards, and suggesting a quicker appeals process,
disallowing the arbitrary imposition of death sentences).
45. See Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04.
46. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193 n.44; see also WHITE, supra note 36, at 5-6
(explaining that the Gregg and Woodson decisions constitute a tension between a desire
for the even-handed application of the death penalty and a desire for individualized
sentencing in capital cases).
47. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). In Lockett, the Court held
that a defendant must be permitted to introduce mitigating factors during the sentencing
phase of his or her trial. See id.
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factors permissible during a defendant's sentencing phase.'
2. The Extensive and Drawn Out Appeal Route for a Defendant
Sentenced to Death
In 1983, the Court changed its focus from requiring procedural
safeguards in death penalty cases to speeding up the often lengthy
appeals process for death penalty cases.49 . Ultimately, in the last
fourteen years, the Court has dismissed all principal challenges to the
capital punishment systemic Particularly in habeas death-penalty
cases, the Court appears troubled by drawn-out litigation, because in
most federal habeas cases, the defendant faces a very prolonged and
extensive appeals process."
Although each state's capital punishment statute differs, some
common trends exist. 2 Usually, death penalty sentencing involves
two separate trials. 53 The first trial requires a jury to determine if the
48. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 432-33 (1980). In 1980, the Court
limited the use of broadly defined aggravating circumstances in the sentencing phase of
a defendant's trial and held that an aggravating circumstance cannot be defined so
broadly that it provides no direction to the jury. See id. But see Beck v. Alabama, 447
U.S. 625, 638 (1980) (finding a capital punishment statute that limited the jury's ability
to impose a lesser offense on the defendant unconstitutional). See generally WHITE,
supra note 36, at 8 (discussing Lockett, Godfrey, and Beck).
49. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 9-10 (citing Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880
(1983)). White notes that Barefoot best illustrates the Court's new commitment to
speedier death penalty appeals. See id. at 10. In Barefoot, the prisoner sought a stay of
execution, appealing to the Fifth Circuit on January 14, 1983. See Barefoot, 463 U.S.
at 886. Only five days later, his petition was argued, even though none of the circuit
judges had seen the petitioner's trial transcript, or the transcript of his federal habeas
hearing. See id. Despite the fact that United States Courts of Appeals generally do not
hand an opinion down for some time after oral arguments, the Fifth Circuit rendered an
opinion the following day, denying the defendant's claims. See id. The Supreme Court
upheld the Fifth Circuit's action, thereby encouraging speedy appeal processes for
capital defendants. See id. at 906.
50. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 11; see e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279
(1987) (rejecting defendant's argument that Georgia's death penalty statute is racially
biased). The Court seems to be particularly troubled in habeas cases by drawn out
litigation. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 14. In most federal habeas cases, the defendant
faces a very prolonged and extensive appeals process. See id.
5 1. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 14. "[T]he Court was particularly concerned with
expediting consideration of death penalty cases in the federal courts. This concern
undoubtedly stemmed from its realization that death penalty litigation in the federal
courts is often protracted, sometimes stretching out for several years and involving
multiple habeas corpus petitions." Id.
52. See RONALD L. CARLSON, CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCEDURE 214 (5th ed. 1995); see
also supra note 43 (listing states having death penalty statutes).
53. See WHITE, supra note 36; see, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-97-101 (Michie Supp.
1997). The statute states:
The following procedure shall govern jury trials which include any felony
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defendant is guilty of a capital crime.' If the jury finds guilt, it then
determines the defendant's sentence based on a presentation of
aggravating and mitigating evidence in the second trial." If a
defendant receives the death sentence and seeks appellate review, he or
she first must exhaust all state appellate relief.5 Most state statutes
provide for automatic appeal in which the state appellate court
charges: (1) The jury shall first hear all evidence relevant to every charge on
which a defendant is being tried and shall retire to reach a verdict on each
charge.
(2) If the defendant is found guilty of one (1) or more charges, the jury shall
then hear additional evidence relevant to sentencing on those charges.
Evidence introduced in the guilt phase may be considered, but need not be
reintroduced at the sentencing phase.
(3) Following the introduction of additional evidence relevant to sentencing,
if any, instruction on the law, and argument, the jury shall again retire and
determine a sentence within the statutory range.
(4) The court, in its discretion, may also instruct the jury that counsel may
argue as to alternative sentences for which the defendant may qualify. The
jury, in its discretion, may make a recommendation as to an alternative
sentence. However, this recommendation shall not be binding on the court.
(5) After a jury finds guilt, the defendant, with the agreement of the
prosecution and the consent of the court, may waive jury sentencing, in which
case the court shall impose sentence.
(6) After a plea of guilty, the defendant, with the agreement of the prosecution
and the consent of the court, may be sentenced by a jury impaneled for
purposes of sentencing only.
Id.
54. See CARLSON, supra note 52, at 214-16. The Supreme Court has offered guidance
as to what crimes may and may not result in capital punishment. See id. (citing
Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (holding unconstitutional a death
sentence of a 15-year-old or younger defendant found guilty of murder)); Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (holding that imposition of the death penalty on
mentally retarded adults is not per se unconstitutional); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S.
376 (1986) (holding a requirement that a capital defendant be found to have killed,
attempted to kill, or intended to kill in order to receive a death sentence) (other citations
omitted).
55. See CARLSON, supra note 52, at 214-16; see also URSULA BENTELE, CAPITAL CASE
SENTENCING: How TO PROTECT YOUR CLIENT 12 (1988) (noting that "during the penalty
phase ... [t]here are several distinct types of statutory burdens . . . The most common
type of statute requires the prosecution to prove at least one aggravating circumstance,
and that circumstance must outweigh the mitigating factors presented by the defense.").
Although a jury can determine that a defendant should receive a life sentence, rather
than a death sentence in capital cases, only a limited number of states allow juries to
determine the length and types of sentences for defendants in non-capital cases. See
CARLSON, supra note 52, at 218. Allowing juries to determine the length and type of
sentences in non-capital cases is generally condemned. See id. at 217-18. Critics
recognize a need for experts to determine sentences in non-capital cases in order to
prevent arbitrary and non-uniform sentences. See id.
56. See IRA P. ROBBINS, ABA TASK FORCE ON DEATH PENALTY HABEAS CORPUS,
TOWARD A MORE JUST AND EFFECTIVE SYSTEM OF REVIEw IN STATE DEATH PENALTY CASES

43 (1990).
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generally reviews both the conviction and the sentence. 7 When
review is exhausted at the state level, a defendant typically files a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. 8 If the writ of
certiorari is denied, the defendant then enters a second phase of state
post-conviction petitions.5 9 In this second phase of state appeals, the
defendant brings forth constitutional claims. 60
After exhausting state relief, the defendant may then turn to federal
habeas remedies 6' if the defendant claims denial of constitutional
rights.62 First, the defendant files a writ of habeas corpus in federal
district court.63 Next, the federal district court will hold a full
hearing. 4 Appeals, including a petition for writ of certiorari, generally
57. See Barry Nakell, The Cost of the Death Penalty, 14 CRIM. L. BULL. 68 (1978),
reprintedin HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 241-46 (3rd. ed. 1982).
"If the judgment is death, the case will be appealed; indeed, most statutes provide for
automatic appeal of death sentences." Id. at 243 (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141(4)
(Supp. 1976-1977); GA. CODE ANN. §27-2537(a) (Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STATE. § 152000(d)(1) (Supp. 1977)). In fact, of the 37 states with death penalty statutes, only one
state, Arkansas, does not require a mandatory appeal. See Richard C. Dieter, Ethical
Choices For Attorneys Whose Clients Elect Execution, 3 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 799, 810
n.81 (1990).
58. See Nakell, supra note 57, at 245. The Supreme Court denies most writs of
certiorari, due to their overwhelming volume. See CARLSON, supra note 52, at 234
(commenting that the Supreme Court grants certiorari in only about five to six percent
of cases). However, despite the limited grants of certiorari, the Court decides a
significant number of death penalty cases each term. See David 0. Stewart & Scott
Nelson, Hip Deep in the Death Penalty, 74 A.B.A. J. 40, 40 (1988) (stating that in 1987
the Supreme Court decided 10 death penalty cases).
59. See Nakell, supra note 57, at 245 (noting "prisoners sentenced to death exhaust
every imaginable avenue for relief").
60. See CARLSON, supra note 52, at 247.
61. See Nakell, supra note 57, at 245. Nakell notes that if federal habeas relief is
unsuccessful, defendants often seek governor commutation, as well as additional state
and federal review. See id. Commutation, clemency, or pardon "is an official act by an
executive that removes all or some of the actual or possible punitive consequences of a
criminal conviction." KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 4 (1989).
62. See CARLSON, supra note 52, at 246 (noting that "federal habeas corpus courts sit
to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in violation of the U.S. Constitution"); see
also 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (1994) (providing requirements for application for writ of habeas
corpus).
63. Habeas corpus is a prisoner's right to challenge his or her incarceration in federal
court. See U.S. CONST. Art I, §9, cl.2 which provides: "The Privilege of Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public
Safety may require it." See David P. Saybolt, et al., Habeas Relief for State Prisoners, 85
GEO. L.J. 1507, 1507 n. 2706 (1997).
64. See ROBBINS, supra note 56, at 43 n.115; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (1994)
(stating that "[tihe person to whom the writ or order is directed shall make a return
certifying the true cause of the detention" and that "[wihen the writ or order is returned a
day shall be set for hearing, not more than five days after the return unless for good cause
..11).
.
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follow. 65 This long and specialized process of appeals usually results
in delaying a defendant's execution for several years.6
B. Establishmentof Rules of CriminalProcedure Regarding
Introductionof Evidence in Sentencing and Post-Sentencing Death
Penalty Cases
In appealing a sentence or conviction, it is not uncommon for a
defendant to contest the lower court's procedures during his
sentencing phase. 67 Although the Supreme Court generally refuses to
entertain challenges to the capital sentencing system as a whole, it
continues to examine the constitutionality of specific state sentencing
procedures, many of which involve evidentiary questions.68 The
Court is often divided on the constitutionality of different states'
sentencing procedures.69 Additionally, even if the Court finds that
65. See ROBBINS, supra note 56, at 43. Robbins states:
Following Supreme Court Review, if any, the case will become the subject of
state executive-branch clemency proceedings. If clemency is denied,
emergency post-conviction proceedings will be filed in both state and federal
trial courts, with expedited appeals to the state and federal intermediate and
ultimate appellate courts.
Id.
66. See id. at 43 (noting that "it is rare for a death sentence to be carried out within
five or six years of its imposition"). "[Oin average, it took six years and eight months
in 1988, and seven years and two months in 1986 and 1987, for death-sentence inmates
to be executed from time of sentencing to execution." See id. at 43 n. 116.
67. See id. at 158-59. In fact, as per the advice of their attorney, defendants will
contest procedures for the main purpose of causing delay; delay is a strategic tactic often
used by defense attorneys. See id. at 159. Multiple factors result in the delay of capital
proceedings, including:
delays in appointing counsel; delays from less than adequate competence of
counsel; delays in processing state transcripts and records; delays from
reviewing records that are ordinarily longer than in non-capital cases; delays
from state policies and procedures; delays from uncertainty concerning the
substantive criminal law and Eighth amendment law; delays from the
application of, and uncertainty about the interpretation of, threshold inquiries
for federal habeas corpus review; delays from discovery of new facts; delays
from developments in the law; and delays from the understandable inclination
of both litigants and their attorneys to postpone the ultimate sanction.
Id.
68. See infra notes 71-105 and accompanying text (discussing specific cases in
which the Court has examined and ruled on the constitutionality of different states'
sentencing procedures).
69. See, e.g., Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986) (finding that refusal to
allow jury consideration of potentially mitigating evidence violates the Eighth
Amendment); Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985) (finding it unconstitutional
for a prosecutor to inform a sentencing jury that its decision would be reviewed);
California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) (upholding a state procedure that informs a
sentencing jury of the governor's ability to pardon a defendant's death sentence);
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states' procedures are unconstitutional, it is often at odds as to what
part of the Constitution prohibits those particular procedures. 70
1. Deciding a Death Sentence on Evidence Unavailable to the
Defendant
State procedures that allow a death sentence to be decided in part on
the basis of a pre-sentence investigation report, not fully disclosed to
the defendant, violates the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution. 7'
In Gardnerv. Florida,although the jury advised that the defendant be
sentenced to life imprisonment rather then death,7 2 the judge requested
a pre-sentence investigation report and subsequently sentenced the
defendant to death. 73 Although the Court found the procedure
followed by the judge to be unconstitutional, it differed as whether the
Eighth 74 or the Fourteenth 5 Amendment prohibited the procedure.76
Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (vacating, under the Eighth Amendment, a death
sentence partially decided on a presentence investigation report to which the defendant
did not have full access).
70. See infra notes 71-105 (discussing four Supreme Court opinions in which the
justices disagreed as to what constitutional provisions govern different state sentencing
procedures); see also supra note 36 (discussing constitutional provisions under which
death penalty statutes are generally challenged).
71. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362.
72. See id. at 352-53. In Gardner, the defendant was convicted of first degree murder.
The jury "expressly found that the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating
circumstances and advised the court to impose a life sentence [on the defendant]." Id. at
352-53.
73. See id. The judge based his decision on evidence presented at both the guilt and
sentencing phases of the trial, as well as his review of the pre-sentence investigation
report, a portion of which was undisclosed. See id. at 353.
74. "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
75. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.The amendment states:
No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges and
immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any state deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Id.
76. Gardner produced seven separate decisions. Justices Stevens, Stewart and Powell
represented a three-member plurality that based its holding on the Due Process Clause.
See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351-62. Specifically, the plurality found that it is
impermissible to withhold from the defendant part of a pre-sentence investigation
report. See id. at 360-61. Further, even if it were allowable, the full report would have
to be part of the appeal record because, "[w]ithout full disclosure of the basis for the
death sentence the ... capital sentencing procedure would be subject to the defects [that]
resulted in the holding of unconstitutionality in Furman v. Georgia." Id. at 361. Then
Chief Justice Burger concurred in the judgment with no opinion. See id. at 362 (Burger,
J., concurring). Additionally, Justice White concurred on the basis that the Eighth
Amendment's ban on cruel and unusual punishment prohibits a state from imposing the
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However, the controlling concurrence 77 reasoned that the procedure
for imposing the death sentence on the defendant violated the Eighth
Amendment rather than the Due Process Clause.'
2. Introduction of Evidence Regarding Offender's Character
A state's refusal to admit evidence of a defendant's good behavior in
prison also violates the Eighth Amendment' S79 prohibition on the
exclusion of relevant mitigating evidence. 0 In Skipper v. South
Carolina,8 ' the prosecution argued, during the defendant's penalty
phase, that if not sentenced to death, the defendant would likely rape
prisoners and cause disciplinary problems in jail. 82 The Supreme
Court remanded the case because the defendant was precluded from
introducing mitigating evidence that he had previously behaved well in
prison.83 Once again, however, the Supreme Court disagreed as to
what constitutional principle the trial court violated.'
death sentence on the basis of information in a pre-sentence report, part of which was
not given to the defendant. See id. at 364 (White, J., concurring). Justice Blackmun
also concurred based on precedent and the opinions of Justices Brennan and Marshall.
See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). In a separate opinion, Justice Brennan agreed with
the plurality's due process holding, but reiterated his belief that the death penalty is
prohibited in all cases under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 364-65
(Brennan, J., concurring). Further, Justice Marshall dissented, both because of his
belief that the death penalty is always unconstitutional, and because Florida failed to
follow required capital sentencing procedures. See id. at 365 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Finally, Justice Rehnquist also dissented. See id. at 371 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
77. When a case produces no majority opinion, the concurrence providing the
necessary fifth vote and written on the narrowest grounds constitutes the controlling
opinion. See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). Of the Justices whose
votes were necessary to render the judgment, Justice White's concurrence, which relied
on the Eighth Amendment, was based on the narrowest grounds. Thus, his concurrence
constitutes the controlling rule in Gardner. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 363-65 (White, J.,
concurring).
78. See Gardner, 430 U.S. at 365 (White, J., concurring).
79. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986). In a footnote, the Court
also noted the Fourteenth Amendment's "due process requirement that a defendant not be
sentenced to death 'on the basis of information which he had no opportunity to deny or
explain."' Id. at 5 n. 1.
80. See id. at 8. In Skipper, the defendant received the death penalty after a jury found
him guilty of murder and rape. See id. at 2. In seeking the death penalty, the
prosecution argued that, if sentenced to a prison term, the defendant would likely commit
criminal acts while in prison. See id. at 3. The defendant attempted to offer mitigating
evidence in the form of testimony regarding his prior good behavior in prison. See id.
81. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
82. See id. at 3.
83. See id. at 8-9.
84. See id. at 9-15. The plurality found that the procedure violated the Eighth
Amendment. However, a three-member concurrence in Skipper disagreed as to whether
the state's conduct violated the Eighth Amendment and concluded, on narrower grounds,
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3. Introduction of Evidence of Post-Sentencing Laws
In addition to determining what evidence may be introduced
regarding a defendant's character at the sentencing phase of his or her
trial, the Supreme Court has also decided whether informing juries of
state post-sentencing laws is constitutional.85 The Supreme Court
gives deference to state choice in determining what information a jury
should consider in the death penalty sentencing phase of a defendant's
trial.86 For example, in California v. Ramos, 87 the Supreme Court
held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments do not prohibit the
Briggs instruction, which informs juries in a sentencing procedure that
the Governor has the power to pardon or modify a defendant's
sentence. 88
In contrast, though the Court will generally defer to the states'
choices, it will not allow states to provide the jury with inaccurate or
misleading information during sentencing hearings. 89 For example, in
that the conduct was only in violation of the rule previously handed down in Gardner.
See id. at 9; see also supra notes 71-78 (discussing Gardner).
85. An example of a state's post sentencing law is where a state requires that a death
sentence receive automatic appeal to the state supreme court. See supra note 57 (stating
that of the 37 states with death penalty statutes, only one does not require a mandatory
appeal); see also infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text (discussing California v.
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983) and Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985), two
cases concerning the introduction of state post-sentencing law).
86. See, e.g., Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1004.
87. 463 U.S. 992.
88. See id. at 1014. The Briggs Instruction was a result of California voter initiative
and mandated that the judge inform the jury that if it decided upon a verdict of life
imprisonment without parole, the Governor could commute it to provide for the
possibility of parole. See id. at 995, 995 n.4.
In Ramos, the defendant was sentenced to death following a conviction for robbery,
attempted murder, and first degree murder. See id. at 995. Pursuant to California law,
which requires the Briggs instruction, the trial judge informed the jury that a sentence of
life imprisonment without parole could be pardoned or modified to imprisonment with
the possibility of parole. See id. In deciding the constitutionality of the Briggs
instruction, the Court noted that "lilt is elementary that States are free to provide greater
protections in their criminal justice system than the Federal Constitution requires. We
sit as judges, not as legislators, and the wisdom of the decision to permit juror
consideration of possible commutation is best left to the States." Id. at 1013-14. State
courts have not always heeded Supreme Court warnings to leave certain decisions up to
the state legislatures. See id. at 1013. For example, New York Governor George Pataki
criticized the New York Court of Appeals, New York's highest court, in going "too far in
protecting the rights of criminal defendants." The Governor's Attack on the Judges,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1996, at C1. In 1996 Governor Pataki introduced legislation that
would mandate the appellate court's deference to United States Supreme Court's rules.
See id.
89. See Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 342 (1985); see also infra notes 9095 (discussing Caldwell).
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Caldwell v. Mississippi,9° the Court found it unconstitutional 9' for a
prosecutor to attempt to minimize the significance of the jury's
decision by arguing that its decision for or against the death penalty
would be automatically reviewed on appeal.' Although the Court
agreed that the prosecutor's argument was both inaccurate and
misleading, it differed as to whether the information was relevant.93
However, the controlling opinion' on this point found that as long as
the information was accurate and not misleading, a state could choose
whether or not to instruct its sentencing juries as to post-sentencing
procedures. 95
4. Introduction of Evidence by Defendant Regarding His Parole
Ineligible Status to Rebut Prosecution's Argument that Defendant
Poses a Future Danger to Society
Until 1994, states were left with the decision whether to inform a
sentencing jury on a capital defendant's possibility of parole. 96
However, in 1994, the Supreme Court, in Simmons v. South
90. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
91. In Caldwell, a jury convicted the defendant of murdering a grocery store owner
during a robbery. See id. at 324. During his sentencing hearing, the defendant's
lawyers emphasized to the jury the seriousness and responsibility of imposing the death
penalty. See id. To rebut this argument, the prosecution explained to the jury that its
decision would be automatically reviewed on appeal. See id. at 325-26.
92. See id. The prosecutor stated, "Now, [the defense] would have you believe that
you're going to kill this man and they know-they know that your decision is not the
final decision. My God, how unfair can you be? Your job is reviewable. They know it
....
They know, as I know, and as Judge Baker has told you, that the decision you
render is automatically reviewable by the Supreme Court." See id. at 325-26.
93. The plurality, written by Justice Marshall, and joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens, determined that the defendant's death sentence should be
overruled because of the impropriety of the prosecutor's statements. The Court
distinguished Ramos by pointing out that Ramos did not hold that States may decide to
educate juries on any information regarding post-sentencing procedures. See id. at 33537. Specifically, the Court stated that the prosecutor's statements to the jury in Ramos
were both "accurate and relevant to a legitimate state penological interest." Id. at 355.
In contrast, the Court found the argument presented to the Caldwell jury to be neither
accurate nor relevant. See id. at 336.
94. Justice O'Connor's concurrence controlled this point. See supra note 77.
95. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 342. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor agreed that
no "valid state penological interest" condoned giving the jury inaccurate and misleading
information. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor disagreed
that appellate review information is irrelevant to a jury's determination of a defendant's
sentence. See id. at 342-43 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated,
"Should a State conclude that the reliability of its sentencing procedure is enhanced by
accurately instructing the jurors on the sentencing procedure, including the existence
and limited nature of appellate review, I see nothing in Ramos to foreclose a policy
choice in favor of jury education." Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring)
96. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994).
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Carolina,held that where a defendant is ineligible for parole and the
prosecution, in seeking the death penalty, argues that the defendant
presents a future danger to society, the defendant must be allowed to
inform the jury that he is parole ineligible if sentenced to life
imprisonment.9 7 Simmons produced no majority opinion for the
Court.98
The Plurality in Simmons, relying on both Gardnerv. Florida' and
° held that the Due Process Clause
Skipper v. South Carolina,'0
of the
Fourteenth Amendment prohibited a defendant from being sentenced to
death on the basis of information that the defendant was not permitted
to deny or explain.' ' Nonetheless, Justice O'Connor's concurrence,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Kennedy, provided the
controlling opinion in Simmons.'02 Justice O'Connor reaffirmed the
Court's "general deference to state decisions regarding what the jury
should be told about sentencing."' 0' 3 Justice O'Connor then
97. See id. at 178. During deliberations after the sentencing phase of Simmons' trial,
the jury asked the judge: "Does the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the
possibility of parole?" Id. at 160. The judge responded that Simmons' parole
eligibility "is not a proper issue for your consideration." Id.
98. See id. at 154-78. Justices Blackmun, Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg represented
the plurality and based their opinion on the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See id. at 162. Justices Souter and Stevens also wrote a concurrence,
reasoning that the Eighth Amendment required the Simmons rule. See id. at 172-74
Souter & Stevens, JJ., concurring). Justice Ginsburg filed a separate concurrence,
explaining that the decision was narrow, and expressing concern with the plurality's
broad language. See id. at 174-75 (Ginsburg, J., concurring). Chief Justice Rehnquist,
Justice O'Connor, and Justice Kennedy only concurred in the judgment, emphasizing the
narrowness of the decision. See id. at 175-78 (Rehnquist, O'Connor, & Kennedy, JJ.,
concurring). Justices Scalia and Thomas dissented on factual grounds, stating that the
Simmons rule should be applied only if the prosecutor argues about parole. See id. at
178-85 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting); see also Benjamin P. Cooper, Comment,
Truth in Sentencing: The Prospective and Retroactive Application of Simmons v. South
Carolina, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1573, 1579-81 (1996) (providing a brief description of the
plurality opinion, concurring opinions, and the dissenting opinion in Simmons).
99. See supra notes 71-78.
100. See supra notes 79-84.
101. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 164-65 (stating that "[tihe principle announced in
Gardner was reaffirmed in Skipper, and it compels our decision today").
102. See id. at 175-78; see also supra note 72.
103. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 177 (O'Connor, J.,concurring). Justice O'Connor
stated:
We have previously noted with approval ... that '[many state courts have held
it improper for the jury to consider or to be informed-through argument or
instruction-of the possibility of commutation, pardon, or parole' .. .. The
decision whether or not to inform the jury of the possibility of early release is
generally left to the States ...the Constitution does not require (or preclude)
jury consideration of that fact.
Id. at 176 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1013
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distinguished Skipper on the basis that the defendant in Skipper
requested the introduction of factual evidence, rather than evidence of
the State's sentencing law, in order to rebut the prosecutor's future
dangerousness argument.' °4 Thus, Justice O'Connor concurred with
the judgment on the narrow grounds that, when a prosecutor argues
future threat of danger, and the defendant's only available alternative to
the death penalty is life imprisonment without parole, due process
mandates that the defendant be allowed to introduce evidence of his
parole ineligibility.'0 5
C. Assessing Whether Rules of CriminalProcedureShould Be
Applied Retroactively
Given the length of the appeals process, it is likely that, while a
defendant is on death row, a new rule of criminal procedure will come
down that could assist in the appeal of his or her sentence."0 6
Therefore, a defendant will most likely seek to retroactively apply this
new rule to his case in an attempt to upset his death sentence.'0 7 In
1989, the Supreme Court, in the controversial case of Teague v.
Lane,'0 8 radically changed the habeas regime l0 and eliminated the
n.30, 1014 (1983)).
104. See id. at 176. The Court stated, "Unlike in Skipper, where the defendant sought
to introduce factual evidence tending to disprove the State's showing of future
dangerousness . . . petitioner sought to rely on the operation of South Carolina's
sentencing law in arguing that he would not pose a threat to the community if he were
sentenced to life imprisonment." Id.
105. See id. at 178.
106. See generally WHITE, supra note 36, at 19-21 (stating that retroactive decisions
have enormous significance for death row inmates seeking relief); see also supra note
56 (examining the frequency of Supreme Court review of capital sentencing cases).
107. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 178.
108. 489 U.S. 288 (1989). The Teague Court reached this decision sua sponte, and
thus, without briefing or oral argument. See Karl N. Metzner, Note, Retroactivity,
Habeas Corpus, and the Death Penalty: An Unholy Alliance, 41 DUKE L.J. 160, 164
(1991). In Teague, an all-white jury convicted an African-American of attempted murder,
armed robbery, and aggravated battery. See Teague, 498 U.S. at 292-93. The prosecutor
used all of his preemptory challenges to exclude African-Americans from the jury. See
id. at 293. The trial judge denied defendant's motions for a mistrial. See id. After
defendant's attempts on direct appeal were unsuccessful, defendant filed a habeas petition
arguing, inter alia, that he was entitled to relief under the Sixth Amendment's fair cross
section requirement. See id. Although neither party raised the issue, the Court decided to
address retroactivity sua sponte and held that the rule petitioner sought, that the Sixth
Amendment's fair cross section requirement should extend to the petit jury, should not
be applied retroactively. See id. at 316.
109. See Alan W. Clarke, ProceduralLabyrinths and the Injustice of Death: A Critique
of Death Penalty Habeas Corpus (PartTwo), 30 U. RICH. L. REV. 303, 322 (1996); see
also John Blume & William Pratt, The Changing Face of Retroactivity, 58 U. Mo.
KANSAS CITY L. REV. 581, 581 (1990) (noting that "Teague v. Lane marked, in the eyes
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preexisting procedure for treatment of new rules of criminal
procedure. "0° In Teague, the Supreme Court held that a "new rule""'
in a criminal proceeding would not be applied retroactively on
collateral review." 2 Thus, under Teague, a habeas corpus petitioner
cannot apply a new rule retroactively to his claim unless it falls under
one of two narrow exceptions. 1 3 Although Teague did not specify
whether the rule would be applied to death sentence petitioners, the
Supreme Court, in Penry v. Lynaugh,t 4 extended Teague's
retroactivity rule to capital cases." 5 Under Teague, retroactivity is
decided as a "threshold" matter, and only then will the Court examine
of many, an attempt by the United States Supreme Court to judicially limit the scope of
federal habeas corpus review") (citations omitted).
110. See Cooper, supra note 98, at 1576. Congress recently amended 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d), seeming to codify the Supreme Court's holding in Teague as applied to the
retroactivity standard in federal habeas petitions. See id. Cooper states "[ajlthough
Congress did not explicitly say so, the new statute appears to codify the Supreme
Court's controversial decision in Teague v. Lane." Id. at 1576 (citing 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d) (1996) (amended 1996)). 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) states:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless
the adjudication of the claim (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a
decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light
of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
28 U.S.C.S. § 2254(d) (Law Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 1997), amended by Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214.
111. See infra Part II.C.2.
112. Thus, Teague's retroactivity bar does not apply to cases on direct review, rather,
only to habeas corpus petitions. See Marshall J. Hartman & Jeanette Nyden, Habeas
Corpus and the New FederalismAfter the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 30 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 337, 347 (1997) (stating that, on direct review, all
Supreme Court decisions are applied retroactively).
113. See infra Part II.C.2.b and accompanying text (discussing Teague's two
exceptions).
114. 492 U.S. 302 (1989).
115. See Clarke, supra note 109, at 322. Penry also extended Teague's two
exceptions to capital cases. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 330. Penry's extension of Teague
was also mandated "without the benefit of briefing or oral argument." Id. at 342
(Brennan, J., dissenting in part). In Penry, the defendant, who was mentally retarded,
was found guilty of capital murder and sentenced to death, despite his insanity defense.
See id. at 307-11. The defendant argued, inter alia, that his death sentence violated the
Eighth Amendment because the jury was not instructed that it could consider mitigating
evidence of the defendant's mental retardation. See id. at 311. The Court applied Teague
and found that the rule the defendant sought to apply was not new. See id. at 318-19; see
also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing what constitutes a new rule under Teague). Further, the
Court found that, even if it were new, it fell under Teague's first exception. See Penry,
492 U.S. at 330; see also infra Part II.C.2.b (discussing Teague's first exception).
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the merits of the petitioners' arguments."'
1. Pre-Teague:Case by Case Approach
Before Teague, the Court performed a case-by-case analysis to
determine whether new criminal procedure rules should be applied
retroactively." 7 Specifically, the Court would announce a new rule in
one case, and then decide, either in that case or a later case, whether to
apply that rule retroactively." 8 The Court looked to the prior history
of the rule and instructed courts to weigh the pros and cons of
retroactive application in each case." 9 The Court later specified this
case-by-case approach in Stovall v. Denno, 120 by creating a threeprong balancing test that looked to "(a) the purpose to be served by the
new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement
authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration
of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.'' 2' Fifteen
years after Stovall, the Supreme Court modified the balancing test and
held that a rule must meet
certain requirements before it can be
22
analyzed under Stovall.1

116. See Blume & Pratt, supra note 109, at 581 (stating "[u]nder this approach, a
court would first decide whether the rule required to grant a petitioner relief applied
retroactively. Only after a court decided that such a rule would apply retroactively would
it determine whether the Constitution required such a rule.").
117. See Stephen P. Garvey, Politicizing Who Dies, 101 YALE L.J. 187, 192 (1991);
see, e.g., Yates v. Aiken , 484 U.S. 211 (1988) (determining retroactivity of Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985)); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323 (1980) (deciding
whether the rule in Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130 (1979) could be retroactively
applied).
118. See Garvey, supra note 117, at 192.
119. See Blume & Pratt, supra note 109, at 585 (citing Linkletter v. Walker, 381
U.S. 618 (1965)). In Linkletter, the Court stated that in determining retroactivity,
courts should look to the rule's "purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation
will further or retard its operation." Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629.
120. 388 U.S. 293 (1967). In Stovall, a state prisoner sought to retroactively apply
rules prohibiting identification evidence where, in the absence of counsel, the defendant
was shown to identifying witnesses before trial. See id. at 295. In deciding whether the
rule should be applied retroactively, the Court looked to the rule's purpose, the law
enforcement authorities' reliance on the old rule, and the effect of retroactive application
of the new rule. See id. at 297. The Court found that "retroactive application [of the
rules petitioner sought to apply] 'would seriously disrupt the administration of our
criminal laws."' Id. at 300 (quoting Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 731 (1966)).
Thus, the Court denied the prisoner's request to apply the rules retroactively. See id.
121. Blume & Pratt, supra note 109, at 585-86 (quoting Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S.
293 (1967)). The Court laid out the Stovall test, finding no justification for the
establishment of a bright line rule. See id. at 586.
122. See id. at 586 (citing United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537 (1982)). Blume
and Pratt argue that the Johnson Court defined a "spectrum," in which the Stovall
balancing test fell in the middle. See id. at 587. On one end of the spectrum were
decisions that would always be applied retroactively because they were either dictated by
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2. Teague v. Lane: Uniform Approach to Retroactive Application of
New Rules of Criminal Procedure
In Teague, the Court overruled the Stovall balancing test in habeas
corpus proceedings.'2 The Teague Court announced a sweeping
mandate that new rules of criminal procedure would not be applied
retroactively unless they fell under one of two narrow exceptions. 24
a. "New Rule" Under Teague v. Lane
As defined in Teague, a case introduces a new rule if "it breaks new
ground or imposes a new obligation on the States or the Federal
government," or if "the result was not dictated by precedent existing at
the time the defendant's conviction became final.' ' 5 Since Teague,
the Court has offered additional guidance on what constitutes a new
rule."16 For example, the Court has stated that a rule is new if it is
subject to debate among either reasonable minds 271 or reasonable
jurists," or if existing precedent would have compelled a state court
29
to conclude that the Constitution required the rule in question.,
Finally, the Court has emphasized that the purpose behind Teague is to
"validate[s] reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing
even though they are shown to be
precedents made by state courts
' 30
contrary to later decisions."'
prior precedent or "a necessary adjunct to a ruling that a trial court lacked authority to
convict or punish a criminal defendant in the first place," or a new rule that "overcome[s]
an aspect of the criminal trial that substantially impairs its truth-finding function and so
raises serious questions about the accuracy of guilty verdicts in past trials." Id. at 587
(citing Johnson, 457 U.S. at 550, 544). On the other end of the spectrum were rules that
broke from precedent and would not be applied retroactively. See id. This language
sounds similar to the Teague doctrine because the Teague Court relied on Johnson to
create the Teague doctrine. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
123. See Blume & Pratt, supra note 109, at 587 (stating that "[Teague] overruled the
Stovall balancing test insofar as it applied to collateral proceedings").
124. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 310; see also Garvey, supra note 117, at 192 (stating,
"In Teague v. Lane, . . . the Supreme Court dramatically altered the existing habeas
regime . . . [and] categorically held, with two narrow exceptions, that new rules of
criminal procedure would not be applied retroactively on collateral appeal to any
defendant whose conviction had become final before the new rule was announced").
125. Teague, 489 U.S. at 301.
126. See infra notes 127-130 and accompanying text.
127. See Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990).
128. See Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990). A jurist is "[olne who is
versed or skilled in law; ... [a] judge; a legal scholar." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 855
(6th ed. 1990).
129. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 (1990); see also Teague, 489 U.S. at 306
(stating that the state court need only apply the constitutional standards that prevailed at
the time the original proceedings took place).
130. Saffle,494 U.S. at 488 (quoting Butler, 494 U.S. at 414).
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b. Application of the Two Exceptions Under Teague
Although Teague generally prohibits retroactive application of new
rules, two exceptions to the Teague doctrine exist. Therefore, if a
defendant seeks to apply a new rule, he or she can nonetheless apply it
retroactively if it qualifies under one of these two exceptions.' 3'
The first exception to Teague provides that a new rule can be applied
retroactively if it "places 'certain kinds of primary, private individual
conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe.""' 132 This exception arises in two instances: (1) where the
rule that the defendant seeks to apply retroactively finds that the
defendant's conduct was, in fact, not criminal; and (2) where the rule
133
prohibits a particular punishment on a certain class of defendants.'
This exception, in essence, stands for the proposition that, if a new
rule holds that an activity is legal, rather than illegal, the Court will
apply it retroactively, even if the rule is deemed new.t34 In the capital
punishment context, this exception will also encompass categories of
people or types of crimes that have been found to be beyond the scope
of the death penalty.135 Critics note, however, that this first exception
will not be frequently met."
131. See infra notes 126-39 and accompanying text.
132. Teague, 489 U.S. at 311 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692
(1971) (Harlan, J., concurring in part)); Clarke, supra note 109, at 304-05; see also infra
notes 132-36 and accompanying text (discussing the first exception to the Teague
doctrine).
133. See Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 241-42 (stating that "[tihe first [exception] applies to
new rules that place an entire category of primary conduct beyond the reach of the
criminal law . . .or new rules that prohibit imposition of a certain type of punishment
for a class of defendants because of their status or offense") (citations omitted). Id. at
241.
134. See Metzner, supra note 108, at 167. An example of conduct once illegal, that
is later made legal, is the manufacture, sale, and transportation of alcohol. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVIII, repealedby U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.
135. See Blume & Pratt, supra note 109, at 597 n.130. Blume & Pratt provide
examples of these types of rules:
Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986) (prohibiting the execution of a
person that is currently insane) ...Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(precluding the death penalty as a possible punishment of the crime of rape of
an adult woman) ...Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982), and modified in
Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (prohibiting persons who do not have
the requisite moral culpability to warrant the imposition of capital
punishment, while possibly being legally guilty of murder under state law,
from being sentenced to death).
Id. See generally WHITE, supra note 36, at 20 (discussing retroactivity decisions of the
Supreme Court).
136. See Metzner, supra note 108, at 179 (stating "[tihe opportunities for
application of this exception will be few and far between"). But see Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 330 (1989). In Penry, the Court, in a unanimous section of the opinion,
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The second exception relates to "'watershed rules of criminal
procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the
criminal proceeding. 1 37 This exception requires two things: (1) that
the rule be a "watershed rule of criminal procedure[;]" and (2) that the
'
rule be "central to an accurate determination of innocence or guilt[.]'
This second exception extends to rules governing capital sentencing
procedures. 39 However, since Teague, no Supreme Court case,
either capital sentencing or otherwise, has ever found that a rule
qualifies under this second exception."
Although no rule has qualified under Teague's second exception,
the Court has provided an example as to the type of rule that the
exception was intended to reach. 4 ' The Court used the rule
announced in Gideon v. Wainwright, 42 holding that defendants in all
felony criminal prosecutions have the right to counsel, as an example
of the type of rule covered by Teague's second exception. 4 3 In
Teague, however, the Court specifically noted that a rule
encompassing the basic components of due process, such as the
stated:
[Ilf we held, as a substantive matter, that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of mentally retarded persons such as Penry regardless of the
procedures followed, such a rule would fall under the first exception to the
general rule of nonretroactivity and would be applicable to defendants on
collateral review.
Id.
137. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 495 (1990)). This exception was originally announced in Teague. See
Teague, 489 U.S. at 311; see also infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (discussing
the second exception to the Teague doctrine).
138. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 311-13; see also Clarke, supra note 109, at 305 (noting
that Justice O'Connor's plurality opinion borrowed the skeleton of this formula from
Justice Harlan's dissent in Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969), but added the
accuracy requirement in the second prong of the rule).
139. See Cooper, supra note 98, at 1596-97 (citing Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S.
461, 478 (1993)). Thus, because the jury has already decided the defendant's guilt or
innocence by the sentencing phase, it appears that the second prong of Teague's second
exception test would apply to an accurate determination of the defendant's sentence. See
Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d 1286, 1291 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
140. See Clarke, supra note 109, at 308.
141. See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495.
142. 372 U.S. 335, 348 (1963) (holding that defendants in all criminal prosecutions
have the right to counsel in felony cases and indigent defendants have the right to have
counsel appointed in felony criminal prosecutions).
143. See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 495. In Saffle, the Court stated that "[allthough the
precise contours of [the second exception to Teague] may be difficult to discern, we have
usually cited Gideon v. Wainwright, holding that a defendant has the right to be
represented by counsel in all criminal trials for serious offenses, to illustrate the type of
rule coming within the exception." Id. (citations omitted).
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Gideon rule, would be unlikely to emerge." Of the several lower
court cases that have applied Teague's second exception, only a few
have ever found a rule to satisfy the exception. 45
III. DISCUSSION
A.

The Facts and the Lower Courts' Opinions

On February 5, 1985, Joseph O'Dell brutally raped, sodomized,
and murdered Helen Schartner.4' A jury found O'Dell guilty of all
three of these crimes. 47 In the sentencing phase of O'Dell's trial, the
prosecution argued that O'Dell should receive the death sentence
because he presented a future danger to society."' To rebut the
144. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313 (1989).
145. See Clarke, supra note 109, at 310-11; Garvey, supra note 117, at 194. The
only cases that have found a rule to qualify under Teague's second exception are:
Humphrey v. Cain, 120 F.3d 526, 529 (5th Cir.) (recognizing that the Cage rule
satisfies the second exception to Teague, yet holding that prior Fifth Circuit precedent
prevents a satisfaction of Teague's second exception in habeas cases and requesting en
banc consideration), reh'g granted, No. 95-31101, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 24818 (5th
Cir.) (en banc); Adams v. Aiken, 41 F.3d 175, 178-79 (4th Cir. 1994) (finding the Cage
rule to satisfy Teague's second exception); Nutter v. White, 39 F.3d 1154, 1157 (1Ith
Cir. 1994) (holding that the rule in Cage v. Louisiana, 498 U.S. 39 (1990) satisfied
Teague's second exception; the Cage case involved a jury instruction that defined
reasonable doubt as "substantial doubt" and "grave uncertainty," and therefore violated
due process); Williams v. Dixon, 961 F.2d 448, 456 (4th Cir. 1992) (holding that a jury
instruction requiring the jury to unanimously find mitigating evidence constituted a new
rule of criminal procedure that qualified under Teague's second exception); Graham v.
Hoke, 946 F.2d 982, 993 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding that the rule in Cruz v. New York, 481
U.S. 186 (1987), which prevents an "admission of a nontestifying codefendant's
confession even if that confession interlocks with that of the defendant" falls under the
second exception to Teague); Ostrosky v. Alaska, 913 F.2d 590, 594 (9th Cir. 1990)
(holding that a defendant's right to rely on a lower court's finding of a statute's
unconstitutionality in that defendant's case constitutes a new rule that qualifies under
Teague's second exception); Hall v. Kelso, 892 F.2d 1541, 1543 n.l (11 th Cir. 1990)
(stating that "a burden-shifting error would be subject to retroactive correction on
habeas review because, not only is it a 'bedrock, "axiomatic and elementary"
[constitutional] principal,' but it is also an error that diminishes the 'likelihood of an
accurate conviction"') (citations omitted); Safian v. Scully, No. 90 Civ. 7489, 1991 WL
143403 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the Cruz rule satisfies Teague's second
exception), affd, 962 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Hopkinson v. Shillinger, 888 F.2d
1286, 1292 (10th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (holding that the rule in Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985), satisfies the second Teague exception). Note that the Supreme
Court later effectively overruled Hopkinson in Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234
(1990), see also supra notes 90-95 for a discussion of Caldwell.
146 See O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1972 (1997). O'Dell beat the victim
on the head with a gun barrel and strangled her with such force that he broke her neck
bones and left finger imprints on her neck. See id. at 1971.
147 See id. at 1972.
148 See id. The prosecution argued two aggravating circumstances: (1) that O'Dell
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prosecution's argument that O'Dell posed a future danger to society,
O'Dell requested a jury instruction providing that if he were sentenced
to life imprisonment he would be ineligible for parole.1 49 The trial
judge denied O'Dell's request.' 5 After deliberating for only seventytwo minutes,' 5' the jury recommended that O'Dell be sentenced to
death because O'Dell would present a continuing threat to society. 52
O'Dell exercised his automatic right of appeal to the Supreme Court
of Virginia which unanimously affirmed the trial court's conviction
and sentence."5 Next, O'Dell petitioned for writ of certiorari, arguing
that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments required that he be
permitted to inform the jury that he was parole ineligible.' 54 The
Supreme Court denied that petition.' 55 After exhausting the possibility
presented a future danger to society; and (2) that Shartner's murder was "wanton, vile or
inhuman." Id.
In his closing argument, the prosecutor remarked:
Isn't it interesting that he is only able to be outside of the prison system for a
matter of months to a year and a half before something has happened again?
[Y]ou may still sentence him to life in prison, but I ask you ladies and
gentleman[,] in a system, in a society that believes in its criminal justice
system and its government, what does this mean? ... I put it to you ladies and
gentlemen. What is right in this case is that this man has forfeited his right to
live among us because all the times he has committed crimes before and been
before other juries and judges, no sentence ever meted out to this man has
stopped him. Nothing has stopped him, and nothing ever will except the
punishment that I now ask you to impose.
Brief for Petitioner at *2-3, O'Dell v. Netherland, 1997 WL 43522 (No. 96-6867)
[hereinafter Petitioner's Brief].
149. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1972. O'Dell represented himself at trial. See
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 148, at *3.
150. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1972.
15 1. See Brief for Respondent at *3, O'Dell v. Netherland, 1997 WL 80525 (No. 966867) [hereinafter Respondent's Brief].
152. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1972. Although the record stated that the jury found
O'Dell guilty on both aggravating factors, the Virginia Supreme Court concluded that
the jury's recommendation for the death penalty was based only on the fact that O'Dell
presented a future danger to society, rather than on the fact that the victim's murder was
egregious. See id. at 1972 n.l.
153. See O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491, 510 (Va. 1988), cert. granted in
part sub nom. O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 631 (1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1969
(1997). O'Dell also appealed his conviction on a claim of innocence. See O'Dell, 117
S. Ct. at 1972. However, every court agreed that such claim was "not even colorable."
Id.
154. See Respondent's Brief, supra note 151, at.4 (citing Pet. for Cert. No. 88-5007,
at 21-24). O'Dell argued that the Supreme Court had not yet ruled on the issue and that
the Court should now "recognize the relevance of parole ineligibility and require its
admission." Id.
155. See O'Dell v. Virginia, 488 U.S. 871 (1988) (denying petition for certiorari and
petition for rehearing on the jury instruction issue).
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for state habeas relief," O'Dell filed for federal habeas relief, alleging
that he was entitled to re-sentencing based on the Supreme Court's
decision in Simmons v. South Carolina,which permitted a defendant
to inform the jury of his parole ineligibility if the prosecution argued
his future dangerousness to society.' 57 The District Court of the
Eastern District of Virginia granted that request.1 58 However, on
appeal, a divided en banc Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit' 59
reversed the district court's decision, holding that the decision in
Simmons was a "new rule" under the Teague doctrine that could not be
applied retroactively to O'Dell's claim." The Supreme Court granted
certiorari to decide whether the decision in Simmons constituted a new
rule under the Teague doctrine.' 6
B. The Majority Opinion of the United States Supreme Court
In a five-to-four decision,162 the Supreme Court upheld the Fourth
Circuit's ruling."6 The Court first concluded that the Simmons rule,
which permits a defendant to introduce evidence of his parole
ineligibility when the prosecution argues his future dangerousness to
society, was new under Teague and therefore could not be applied
retroactively.' 64 In addition, the Court concluded that the Simmons
156. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1972. The Supreme Court also denied O'Dell's
subsequent petition for writ of certiorari. See O'Dell v. Thompson, 502 U.S. 995
(1991).
157. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1972. The Supreme Court decided Simmons
approximately two months prior to the district court's consideration of O'Dell's federal
habeas claim. See id. (citing O'Dell v. Thompson, Civ. Action No. 3:92CV480
(E.D.Va., Sept. 6, 1994), app. 171-172). In Simmons, the Supreme Court held that the
Due Process Clause requires permitting a defendant to inform the jury of his parole
ineligibility if the prosecution argues his future dangerousness to society. See Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 156 (1994); see also supra notes 96-105 and
accompanying text (discussing Simmons).
158. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1792.
159. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted
in part, 117 S. Ct. 631 (1996), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997). Of the 13 judges sitting
en banc for the Fourth Circuit, seven agreed that the rule in Simmons was new and did not
fall under an exception to the Teague doctrine, while six dissenting judges determined
that the rule was not new under Teague. See id. at 1218.
160. See id.
161. See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. 1969.
162. Justice Thomas wrote the majority opinion for the Court, in which Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Scalia joined. Justice Stevens filed a
dissenting opinion, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer joined. See id. at
1971.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 1978; see also infra notes 175-93 and accompanying text (discussing
the Court's holding that Simmons is a new rule).
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rule did not fall under either exception to the Teague doctrine, thus
barring its retroactive application.'
1. Simmons Is a New Rule Under Teague
Writing for the Court, Justice Thomas first noted that a state
prisoner may not disturb his sentence unless he can show that the rule
he seeks to apply retroactively is not new.' 66 The Court noted that a
new rule generally "break[s] new ground," imposes a new obligation
on the state or federal government, or is not dictated by existing
167
precedent when the defendant's conviction becomes final.
Accordingly, Justice Thomas explained that the Court will upset a
defendant's sentence only if the state would have acted objectively
unreasonably by not granting the defendant the remedy he later
pursued in federal court."
The Court then discussed the necessary steps in determining a rule's
status under Teague. 169 The Court applied the Teague doctrine to
165. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978. The Court stated, "Simmons possesses little of
the 'watershed' character envisioned by Teague's second exception." Id.; see also infra
notes 190-94 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's finding that Simmons does
not fall under the second exception to Teague). Note that O'Dell did not raise the issue of
whether his conviction fell within the. first exception to the Teague doctrine. See
O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978.
166. See id. at 1978. Justice Thomas stated that "[blefore a state prisoner may upset
his state conviction or sentence on federal collateral review, he must demonstrate as a
threshold matter that the court-made rule of which he seeks the benefit of is not 'new."'
Id. at 1973.
167. See id. at 1973 (citing Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989)). The Court
further noted that "the Teague doctrine 'validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations
of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to
later decisions."' Id. (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 414 (1990)). The Court
proceeded to state that "reasonable" is an objective standard. See id. (quoting Stringer v.
Black, 503 U.S. 222, 237 (1992)).
168. See id. (stating that "we will not disturb a final state conviction or sentence
unless it can be said that a state court, at the time the conviction or sentence became
final, would have acted objectively unreasonably by not extending the relief later sought
in federal court").
169. See id. When applying Teague, the habeas Court first ascertains the date on
which the defendant's sentence was finalized. See id. Next, the Court decides whether
existing precedent on that date would have obligated a state court to determine that the
Constitution requires the rule the defendant now seeks to apply. See id. If the Court
decides that a state court would not have so determined, then the rule is new and cannot
be applied retroactively unless it falls within one of two narrow exceptions. See id.
Thus, the Court must examine the rule under Teague's two exceptions. See id. If the rule
falls under one of two exceptions to the Teague doctrine, a court may apply it
retroactively, despite its new rule status. See id. The first exception permits retroactive
application for new rules that forbid "criminal punishment of certain primary conduct
[and] rules prohibiting a certain category of punishment for a class of defendants because
of their status or offense." Id. (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 306 (1989)).
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determine whether O'Dell could utilize the Simmons rule to rebut the
prosecution's argument that O'Dell posed a future danger to society. 7
The Court first noted that O'Dell's conviction became final on October
3, 1988,17' and the Simmons decision came down roughly six years
later in 1994.172 After discussing the facts and differing opinions in
Simmons,' 73 the Court turned to the issue of whether the Simmons
rule was new under Teague so as to prohibit retroactive application of
the Simmons rule in reviewing the constitutionality of O'Dell's
sentencing.' 74
In deciding whether the Simmons rule was new, the Court first
noted that Simmons failed to produce a majority opinion for the
Court.' In light of the "array of views" expressed in Simmons, the
Court found that the Simmons rule was "susceptible to debate among
reasonable minds. 1 76 Next, the Court looked to the decisions that
The second exception applies to "watershed rules of criminal procedure implicating the
fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding." Id. (quoting Graham v.
Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993)); see also supra Part lI.C.2.b (discussing Teague's
second exception to the rule prohibiting retroactive application of new rules). The
Court went on to note that "[wihatever the precise scope of this [second] exception, it is
clearly meant to apply only to a small core of rules requiring observance of those
procedures that ... are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at
1973 (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506, 478 (1993)).
170. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1973-79.
171. See id. at 1973. The Court determined that October 3, 1988 was the date on
which the Court denied O'Dell's petition for writ of certiorari to review the Virginia
Supreme Court's affirmation of O'Dell's sentence. See id.
172. See id. The Supreme Court decided Simmons on June 17, 1994. See Simmons v.
South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 154 (1994).
173. The Court discussed the reasoning of both the plurality and concurring opinions
in Simmons. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1974-78. The Simmons plurality opinion relied
on Gardner v. Florida,430 U.S. 349 (1977), and Skipper v. South Carolina,476 U.S. 1
(1986), and decided that "[blecause truthful information of parole ineligibility allows
the defendant to 'deny or explain' the showing of future dangerousness, due process
plainly requires that he be allowed to bring it to the jury's attention[.]" Id. (quoting
Simmons, 512 U.S. at 169). The concurrence, on the other hand, noted that the Court
had previously held it proper for state courts to preclude the jury from receiving
information about the possibility of "commutation, pardon, or parole." See id. Further,
the concurrence distinguished Skipper because it found that Skipper involved
introduction of factual evidence, whereas Simmons involved introduction of evidence
regarding laws of the state. See id. (quoting Simmons, 512 U.S. at 176-77); see also
supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (discussing the Gardner and Skipper
opinions).
174. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1974.
175. See id. In Simmons, there was a three-member plurality, two concurring
opinions and a dissenting opinion. See supra note 98 (discussing the varying opinions
in Simmons).
176. Id. at 1975 (quoting Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415 (1990)). Justice
Thomas stated, "The array of views expressed in Simmons itself suggests that the rule
announced there was, in light of this Court's precedent, 'susceptible to debate among

968

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 29

Simmons relied upon in order to determine whether the rule was new
or should have been considered as part of existing precedent at the time
O'Dell was sentenced. 77 The Court first looked to Gardner v.
Florida,78 which held that, in determining a defendant's sentence, a
judge's consideration of a pre-sentence report that the defendant had
no opportunity to rebut violated the Constitution.' 79 The Court then
examined Skipper v. South Carolina, 80 which held that, where a
prosecutor, in arguing the death sentence, states that a defendant
would present disciplinary problems in prison, the defendant must be
able to rebut that argument by introducing evidence of his previous
good behavior in prison.' 8 ' The Court noted that Gardner itself
82
produced seven opinions with no majority opinion of the Court.'
Additionally, the Court reasoned that Justice White's concurrence,
which provided the rule in Gardner,'83 was a narrow one, based solely
84
on the Eighth Amendment and not the Due Process Clause.
Further, the Court noted that the Gardnerholding should be read very
narrowly and utilized only when considering the issue of whether a
defendant should be allowed to admit evidence of past behavior. 8
The Court then examined the complexity of the capital punishment
legal landscape in 1988.186 In doing so, the Court looked to two
reasonable minds."' Id.
177. See id. at 1975. Simmons relied primarily on Gardner, 430 U.S. at 349 and
Skipper, 476 U.S. at 1. See O'Dell, 117 U.S. at 1975; see also supra notes 66-79 for a
discussion of Gardnerand Skipper.
178. 430 U.S. 349 (1977).
179. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1975; see also supra notes 71-78 and accompanying
text for a detailed explanation of Gardner.
180. 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
181. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1975; see also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's opinion in Skipper).
182. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1975. In Gardner, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Stewart and Powell wrote the opinion and Chief Justice Burger concurred in the
judgment. Justices White and Blackmun wrote separate concurring opinions, Justice
Brennan filed a separate opinion, and Justices Marshall and Rehnquist dissented. See
Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351-65.
183. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1976 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188,
193 (1977); see also supra note 77 (providing the rule of Marks).
184. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1976. Justice White held that "'[a] procedure for
selecting people for the death penalty which permits consideration of . . . secret
information relevant to the character and record of the individual offender' violates the
Eighth Amendment's requirement of 'reliability in the determination that death is the
appropriate punishment."' Id. (italics omitted) (quoting Gardner,430 U.S. at 364).
185. See id. (stating that "the [Gardner]holding is a narrow one ....
Petitioner
points to no secret evidence given to the sentencer but not to him. And, the evidence he
sought to present to the jury was not historical evidence about his 'character and record,'
but evidence concerning the operation of the extant legal regime").
186. See id. at 1976. Justice Thomas noted that "[wihatever support Gardner and
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decisions preceding Simmons which dealt with the introduction of
post-sentencing evidence: California v. Ramos 8 7 and Caldwell v.
88
Mississippi.1
Ramos held that a jury instruction stating that a
defendant sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole could nevertheless receive parole at the Governor's discretion,
was constitutional. 8 9 Similarly, in Caldwell, Justice O'Connor's
concurrence' 9 found that the decision on whether to instruct juries on
post-sentencing proceedings should be left to the states. 9 Thus, in
light of Ramos and Caldwell, the Court held that "a reasonable jurist in
1988 would not have felt compelled to adopt the rule later set out in
Simmons.' ' 92 Accordingly,93 the Court held that, under Teague, the
rule in Simmons was new.

Skipper[,] standing alone, might lend to petitioner's claim that Simmons was a
foregone conclusion, the legal landscape in 1988 was far more complex." Id.
187. 463 U.S. 992 (1983).
188. 472 U.S. 320 (1985). The Fourth Circuit relied on both Ramos and Caldwell in
affirming O'Dell's sentence. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1976.
189. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1976 (citing Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1001-1004); see also
supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text (providing a discussion of Ramos). The
Ramos Court decided that it would defer to the states' judgment in deciding whether such
information should or should not be given to the jury. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1976.
The Court found that Simmons, in effect, carved out an exception to the Ramos rule that
requiring that a defendant be permitted to educate his sentencing jury on post-sentencing
possibilities. See id. at 1976-78.
190. Justice O'Connor's concurrence was the controlling decision in Caldwell on the
issue of whether juries could receive instruction on post-sentencing proceedings. See
O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1977; see also supra note 87-88 (discussing Ramos).
191. See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1977-78. Justice Thomas explained that in Caldwell,
"Justice O'Connor... stat[ed] that, under Ramos, a State could choose whether or not to
'instruc[t] [sic] the jurors on the sentencing procedure, including the existence and
limited nature of appellate review,' so long as any information it chose to provide was
accurate." Id. at 1977 (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 342 (1985))
(O'Connor, J.,concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
192. Id. at 1977. The Court further noted that, although Simmons relied on Gardner
and Skipper, both Gardner and Skipper involved information regarding the defendant's
character and record. See id. Neither case involved the issue of information regarding
post-sentencing procedures under state law, which arose in both Ramos and Caldwell.
See id. In light of the differences in issues, the Court found that a reasonable jurist could
have distinguished between "information about a defendant and information concerning
the extant legal regime." Id. The Court further determined that "[iut would hardly have
been unreasonable ...for the jurist to conclude that his State had acted constitutionally
by choosing not to advise its jurors as to events that would (or would not). follow their
recommendation of a death sentence ... [and may have even] concluded that the most
surely constitutional course ... was silence." Id. at 1977-78.
193. See id. at 1978.
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2. Simmon's Rule Does Not Qualify Under Teague's Second
Exception
The Court concluded its analysis by determining whether the
Simmons rule, although new, fell within the second exception' 94 to
Teague.195 As discussed above, the second exception allows
retroactive application of a new rule if it constitutes a "'watershed
rule[] of criminal procedure' implicating the fundamental fairness and
accuracy of the criminal proceeding."' 96 The Court rejected O'Dell's
argument that the Simmons rule was "on par" with the procedural
protections afforded in Gideon.'97 Rather, the Court found that,
unlike the "sweeping" rule in Gideon that sets forth the affirmative
right to counsel in felony cases, the Simmons rule only grants
defendants a narrow right to rebut evidence." 9 The Court stated that
this narrow right did not alter the Court's understanding of the
"bedrock procedural elements" necessary to the fairness of a
proceeding.' 99 Therefore, the Court held that the Simmons rule did
not fall under Teague's second exception and thus, could not be
applied retroactively to upset O'Dell's 1988 sentence."
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens' dissent, in which Justices Souter, Ginsburg and
Breyer joined, began its analysis by stating that, as per the Court's
decision in Simmons, O'Dell's sentencing hearing violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.2° ' Thus, the dissent
194. See id; see also supra Part II.C.2.b (explaining the parameters of Teague's
second exception).
195. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978.
196. Id. (quoting Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 (1993)).
197. See id. at 1978 (citing Petitioner's Brief, supra note 158, at *35). The
Petitioner's Brief states that "both [Simmons and Gideon] rest upon this Court's belief
that certain procedural protections are essential to prevent a miscarriage of justice[.]"
Petitioner's Brief, supra note 158, at *35.
198. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978.
199. Id. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990)). Justice Thomas
stated: "Simmons possesses little of the "watershed" character envisioned by Teague's
second exception." Id. "[T]he narrow right of rebuttal that Simmons affords to
defendants in a limited class of capital cases has hardly alterted] our understanding of the
bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding." Id.
200. See id. at 1979 (affirming the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision).
201. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1979 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "it is
undisputed that the conduct of the sentencing hearing that lead to the imposition of
[O'Dell's] death penalty violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"). Specifically, the dissent noted that "[O'Dell] was denied the opportunity
to make a fair response to the prosecutor's misleading argument about the future danger
that he allegedly posed to the community." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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found the issue in the present case to be whether O'Dell's death
sentence, which was in violation of the Due Process Clause, should be
upheld merely because O'Dell was sentenced before Simmons.2' The
dissent first emphasized that the Simmons rule applied a fundamental
principal of fairness and accuracy in criminal proceedings, and, as
such, fell under the second exception to Teague.20 3 Next the dissent
found that, even if Simmons did not fall under Teague's second
exception, the rule in Simmons was not new.2
1. Dissent Finds Satisfaction of Teague's Second Exception
The dissent began its analysis by first discussing the general scope
of Teague's second exception.20 5 Specifically, the dissent noted that
the second exception allows the retroactive application of new rules
that encompass "'bedrock procedural elements ... essential to the
substance of a full hearing,"' but limited to those procedures necessary
to provide an accurate determination of a defendant's guilt or
innocence. 206 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court has never found
a rule to be within Teague's second exception, the dissent maintained
that the Simmons rule so qualified.2 7 In response to the majority's
argument regarding the narrowness of the Simmons rule, the dissent
reasoned that Simmons was narrow only because a limited number of
202. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that "this case is not
about whether O'Dell was given a fair sentencing hearing; instead, the question
presented is whether, despite the admittedly unfair hearing, he should be put to death
because his trial was conducted before Simmons was decided." Id. at 1980 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
203. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated that their "decision in
Simmons applied a fundamental principal that is as old as the adversary system itself,
and that had been quite clearly articulated by [the Supreme Court] in two earlier
opinions." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
204. The dissent essentially applied a backwards analysis of Teague, focusing first
on its belief that the Simmons rule fell under Teague's second exception, and then
discussing the fact that Simmons, in the dissent's view, was not even a new rule. See id.
at 1980-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also infra notes 239-48 and accompanying text
(examining the dissent's application of the Teague doctrine to the rule in Simmons).
205. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1980 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra Part
II.C.2.b (explaining the second exception to Teague).
206. O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1980 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 (1971)). The dissent stated that the exception is "limited
to those 'procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate [determination of guilt
or innocence] is seriously diminished."' Id. (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 313
(1989)). The dissent further noted that sentencing procedures are bound by due process
and "the unique character of the death penalty mandates special scrutiny of [that]
procedure in capital cases," and thus falls under this limitation. Id. at 1980 n.3
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
207. See id. at 1980 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the Simmons rule "is
surely a bedrock procedural element of a full and fair hearing").
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states allowed the practice that Simmons prohibited. 0 8 In fact,
according to the dissent, the prevailing view requires that defendants
be permitted to instruct the jury on their life-without-parole sentencing
alternative. 209
The dissent proceeded to highlight the overall significance of the
Simmons rule. 2'0 First, the dissent noted that since Simmons,
Virginia's requirement that the jury be informed of the defendant's
parole ineligible status has resulted in a seventy-five percent decline in
the number of death sentences in Virginia. 1 ' Moreover, the dissent
noted that the Supreme Court itself realized that a jury would more
often recommend the death sentence if no alternative sentence was
available.212 Thus, the dissent concluded that the Simmons rule was a
"bedrock procedural element" that qualified under the second exception
to Teague.21 3

208. See id. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that "only a very few states had
in place procedures that allowed the prosecutor to argue future dangerousness while at the
same time prohibiting defendants from using 'the only way that [they] can successfully
rebut the State's case"') (quoting Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 177
(1994)).
209. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Simmons, 512 U.S. at 167 n.7). In
1994, 26 states provided the jury with an alternative of life imprisonment without
parole for juries deciding for or against a death penalty sentence. See Simmons, 512
U.S. at 167 n.7. Seventeen of those states required the Simmons rule-that the jury be
informed of a defendant's parole-ineligibility. See id. The other nine provide the jury
with two alternatives: life without parole or death. See id.
210. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent contended
that "the broad consensus in favor of giving the jury accurate information in fact
underscores the importance of the rule applied in Simmons." Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
211. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Frank Green, Death Sentences Decline
in Virginia-Life Term Without Parole is Factor in Change, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH,
Nov. 24, 1996, at Al). Due to Virginia's new requirement that juries be informed of the
alternative sentence of life-without-parole, since 1995, only two juries have
recommended that a defendant be sentenced to death. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In contrast, in 1994 alone, juries recommended 10 death sentences. See id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
212. See id. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S.
625, 637 (1980)) (stating that "the likelihood that a jury would find an obviously guilty
defendant eligible for the death penalty was significantly increased when an arguably
more appropriate sentencing alternative was not available").
213. See id. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Specifically, the dissent stated that
"even if the rule in Simmons could properly be viewed as a 'new' rule, it is of such
importance to the accuracy and fairness of a capital sentencing proceeding that it should
be applied consistently to all prisoners whose death sentences were imposed in
violation of the rule, whether they were sentenced before Simmons was decided or after."
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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2. Dissent Determines that.Simmons Is Not New Under Teague
Although the dissent first decided that the Simmons rule fell within
Teague's second exception, the dissent further determined that the rule
was not new under Teague.2 14 The dissent began this section of
analysis by relying on both Gardner and Skipper.2 t5 The dissent
reasoned that, in deciding Simmons, Justice Blackmun specifically
stated that both Gardner and Skipper "compel[led]" the Court's
decision in Simmons. 2 6 Further, the dissent found fault with the
majority's reading of Gardner,which stated that Justice White's
Eighth Amendment-based concurrence provided the rule for that
case. 21 7 The dissent noted that, in Skipper, Justice White "squarely
adopted" Gardner's due process holding. 218 Moreover, the dissent
stated that all nine Justices in Skipper endorsed Gardner'sholding that
a sentencing determination violates due process if it derives in part
from information that a defendant has no opportunity to deny or
explain.219 With regard to Skipper, the dissent found fault with the
majority's distinction between evidence of a defendant's past behavior
and evidence to educate the jury on post-sentencing legal issues.220
The dissent found the distinction irrelevant.22
214. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (asserting that "distinguishing new rules from
those that are not new under our post-Teague jurisprudence is not an easy task, but it is
evident to me that if there is such a thing as a rule that is not new for these purposes, the
rule announced in Simmons is one").
215. See id. at 1981-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 71-84
(discussing Gardnerand Skipper).
216. See id. at 1982 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "the principle announced
in Gardner was reaffirmed in Skipper, and it compels our decision today" (quoting
Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 164-65 (1994))).
217. See id. (Stevens, J.,dissenting) (stating that "[tihe first misstep in the Court's
analysis is its treatment of Gardner"); see also supra notes 182-84 and accompanying
text (providing the majority's view that Justice White's opinion constitutes the
controlling rule in Gardner).
218. O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1982 (Stevens J., dissenting). Justice Stevens expressed
that although Justice White agreed with Skipper's Eighth Amendment reliance, he "went
out of his way" to comment in a footnote that due process provided "even more basic
justification" for Skipper's holding. Id.; see also supra notes 79-84 and accompanying
text (discussing the Court's holding in Skipper).
219. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1982 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that
when the majority adopted Justice White's concurrence for the rule in Gardner,it ignored
the fact that Justice White, in the later decision of Skipper, adopted the Gardner
plurality's holding based on Due Process instead of the Eighth Amendment argument.
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent stated that Justice Powell's
concurrence in Skipper also relied on the Gardner rule. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
220. See id. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
221. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[tlhis distinction is simply not
enough to make the rule in Simmons 'new' . . . [t]he rule in Skipper and Gardner...
simply cannot turn on whether [a defendant's] rebuttal relies on the fact that he is
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Further, although the dissent and majority both relied on Ramos and
Caldwell,22 2 unlike the majority, the dissent found that Ramos and
Caldwell provided additional support for the proposition that the
Simmons rule was not new under the Teague doctrine.
With regard
to Ramos, the dissent disagreed with the majority's assertion that
Simmons carves out an exception to Ramos. 4 The dissent found that
the general rule in Ramos merely permits state courts to instruct juries
accurately in order to avoid the possibility that juries will be misled
about sentencing options.225 In addition, the dissent found the
majority's reading of Caldwell to be "equally unpersuasive. ' '226 The
dissent stated that a jury instruction regarding appellate review or postsentencing proceedings is entirely different from a jury instruction
regarding sentencing alternatives.'
The dissent concluded by reaffirming the particular importance that
the Court has continuously placed in the accuracy of sentencing
proceedings. 2 The dissent maintained that the majority discarded that
concern by relying on a "nonexistent tension" between Gardner and
ineligible for parole or on the fact that he is a model prisoner").
222. See supra notes 187-93 and accompanying text.
223. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated,
"The two cases on which the majority relies to argue that a reasonable jurist in 1988
would have thought that O'Dell did not have a right to rebut the prosecutor's future
dangerousness arguments simply provide further support for the conclusion that
Simmons did not announce a new rule of law." Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
224. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra note 189 (explaining the
majority's view that Simmons is essentially an exception to Ramos).
225. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, I., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted
that the Ramos Court cited the Model Penal Code, section 210.6, which states that if the
jury decides against the death penalty, the jury should be informed about the
possibilities of imprisonment sentencing, including the possibility of the defendant's
parole. See id. n. 10 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing California v. Ramos, 463 U.S.
962, 1009 n.23 (1983)).
226. Id. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 189-91 (discussing
the majority's reading of Caldwell).
227. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1984 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
Apart from the fact that an instruction describing a sentencing alternative does
not relate to 'post sentence procedures,' I see no basis for assuming that
concerns about describing the process of appellate review to a jury might have
anything to do with the necessity for providing the jury with accurate
information about sentencing options when the prosecutor makes the
misleading argument that the death penalty is the only way to prevent a
defendant's future dangerousness 'outside of the prison system.'
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
228. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated that "[tihe Court has
consistently, and appropriately, shown a particular concern for procedures that protect
the accuracy of sentencing determinations in capital cases."
Id. (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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Skipper and Ramos and Caldwell to support its refusal to retroactively
apply the Simmons rule to this case.22 9
IV. ANALYSIS

Perhaps no recent Supreme Court decision is as controversial and
divided as the O'Dell decision. 23 At both the appellate and Supreme
Court stages of the case, only one justice's opinion separated the
otherwise even amount of majority and dissenting judges.3' Thus, it
would be unrealistic to say that either the majority or dissenting
229. See id. (Stevens, J.,dissenting).

230. See The Death March, 1997

PROGRESSIVE

8, 8-9:

Of all the Supreme Court's decisions that came down in June, the most
incomprehensible-and the most unpardonable-had to do with the death
penalty.
• . . [U]nbelievably, the Supreme Court refused to allow O'Dell to use that
precedent [the Simmons rule] to gain a new sentencing hearing .... This
callousness to the rights of defendants, especially those on death row, is
almost ghoulish.
Id.; see also Joan Biskupic, Court Continues Tightening Curbs on Death Row Appeals,
WASHINGTON POST, June 20, 1997, at A9 (opining that "[tihe ruling is another step in
the Supreme Court's march to limit state inmates in their ability to bring their cases to
federal court"); One More Time, USA TODAY, June 20, 1997, at 14A. The USA Today
editorial stated "the court [sic] ruled its 1994 [Simmons] decision was not important
enough to be made retroactive to 1986. What? The principal of informed jury decisionmaking is not important enough to be made retroactive? That surely deserves a second
look." One More Time, supra. Indeed, prior to his execution, Joseph O'Dell gained
worldwide support, including clemency appeals from the Italian government, Pope John
Paul II, the European Parliament, Sister Helen Prejean (author of DEAD MAN WALKING),
Lori Urs, a law student who married O'Dell in prison hours before his execution, and
1,500 civic groups. See Richard Boudreaux, To Italy, at U.S. Convict Symbolized The
Crime Of Capital Punishment, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 17, 1997, at All ("[Hlow a drifter with
14 felony convictions in the United States ended up with a VIP funeral in a foreign
land-which flew his body over by chartered jet-is a story of international politics and
Italian idiosyncrasy .... ); see also Editorial, Proper Punishment?, RICHMOND-TIMES
DISPATCH, Aug. 26, 1997, at A6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Rchtmd File
(remarking that "[m]urderers have the luxury of pleading their own cases for years; the
slain remain silent. Ironically killers have so long ... to portray themselves as victims
of a cruel and unfair justice system because the system is so scrupulous about reviewing
evidence and providing every opportunity for appeal"). O'Dell's tombstone reads:
"Joseph R. O'Dell III, beloved husband of Lori Urs O'Dell, honorary citizen of Palermo,
killed by Virginia, U.S.A. in a merciless and brutal justice system." Boudreaux, supra, at
All.
231. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1218 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert.
granted in part, 117 S. Ct. 631 (1996), aft'd, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997). Seven of the
judges sitting on the Fourth Circuit, en banc found that Simmons was new and did not fit
into either Teague exception, while six judges concluded that the Simmons rule was not
new. See id. at 1218, 1256; see also O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1971, 1979. The Supreme
Court decision constituted a five-to-four split between the majority and the dissenting
opinions. See id.
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opinions are clearly or undeniably correct. 23 2 However, after
reviewing the surrounding case law, 33 it appears that the majority, in
O'Dell correctly concluded that the Simmons rule 234 is new under
Teague v. Lane.235 The majority erred, however, in refusing to
retroactively apply the Simmons rule by allowing it to fall within the
second exception to the Teague doctrine. 236 When assessing whether
the Simmons rule fit under the second exception, the majority
performed only a cursory analysis, and failed to consider strong
arguments supporting the rule's qualification under the exception. 7
As a result, it was unconstitutional to prohibit O'Dell's use of
Simmons to overturn his already finalized death sentence on collateral
review .238
A. Simmons Constitutesa New Rule Under Teague v. Lane
The requirements for a rule to be considered "old" 23 9 for purposes
of the Teague doctrine are difficult to meet, given the Supreme Court's
reluctance to upset a holding and to allow retroactive application of the
law. 240 Indeed, even the dissenting justices in post-Teague opinions
recognize the arguably high standard a rule must meet to be considered
"old" under Teague.24 ' Upon examining Teague and its progeny, the
232. Even Justice Stevens, who authored the dissent in Simmons, admits that
"[d]istinguishing new rules from those that are not new under our post-Teague
jurisprudence is not an easy task." O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
233. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1977).
234. Justice O'Connor's concurrence contains the Simmons rule. See supra note 103
and accompanying text.
235. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978; see also supra notes 169-87 and accompanying
text (discussing the O'Dell majority's analysis of whether Simmons constitutes a new
rule under Teague).
236. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1978.
237. See infra Part IV.B (examining the significance of the Simmons rule and why it
should fall within Teague's second exception).
238. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1979.
239. See id. at 1973. When a rule is "old" under Teague, it can be applied
retroactively.
240. See WHITE, supra note 36, at 23 (stating that the "'new rule' criterion defined an
'old' rule as that which all reasonable jurists in the country would find to be dictated by
precedent").
241. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214, 1222 n.2 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
cert. granted in part, 117 S. Ct. 631 (1996), affd, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997). The Fourth
Circuit provided examples of dissenting justices' language that illustrates how difficult
it is for a rule to be considered old under Teague. See id. For example, in Wright v.
West, Justice Souter, stated: "'To survive Teague, [a rule] must be 'old' enough to have
predated the finality of the prisoner's conviction, and specific enough to dictate the rule
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Supreme Court
has varied in its explanations of what constitutes a
"new rule."24 2 For example, the Court stated in Teague that a rule is
new if it "breaks new ground," "imposes a new. obligation," or was
not "dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's
conviction became final." '43 Since Teague, the Court has described a
new rule as one that is "susceptible to debate among reasonable
minds," 2' or "reasonable jurists." 245 A rule is new unless, on the date
the defendant's conviction was finalized, a reasonable jurist "would
have felt compelled by existing precedent to rule in [the defendant's]
favor. ' ' 2' Despite the Supreme Court's use of different language in
defining a new rule under Teague, the fundamental test remains the
same: a rule is deemed new unless it would have been objectively
unreasonable for a jurist to not extend the rule at the time the
defendant's conviction became final.247 In determining whether a
jurist would have acted unreasonably in failing to extend the rule
sought to be applied, one must examine the existing precedent at the
time of the defendant's finalized conviction. 248
At the time O'Dell's sentence became final, a reasonable jurist
would have considered the four cases constituting the "legal
on which the conviction may be held to be unlawful."' Id. (Souter, J., concurring)
(quoting Wright v. West, 505 U.S. 277, 311 (1992)) (italics omitted). Even Justice
Brennan stated that "'a state prisoner can secure habeas relief only by showing that the
state court's rejection of the constitutional challenge was so clearly invalid under thenprevailing legal standards that the decision could not be defended by any reasonable
jurist."' Id.; Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 417-18 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
242. See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, J.,dissenting); see also Part 1I.C.2
(examining the Court's interpretation of what constitutes a "new" rule). Unlike an "old"
rule, a "new" rule cannot be applied retroactively unless it fits under one of Teague's
exceptions. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1973.
243. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 301 (1989).
244. Butler, 494 U.S. at 415; see also supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text
(examining the Court's definition of a "new" rule).
245. Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 234 (1990); see also supra note 125 and
accompanying text (discussing the Court's definition of what makes a rule "new").
246. Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 467 (1993) (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494
U.S. 484, 488 (1990)).
247. See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1973, 1977; O'Dell v. Netherland, 95 F.3d 1214,
1223-24, 1229 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc), cert. granted in part, 117 S.Ct. 631 (1996),
aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 1969 (1997); see also Butler, 494 U.S. at 414 (stating "The 'new rule'
principle . . . validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing precedents
made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later decisions").
Congress codified and even strengthened the Teague doctrine. See 28 U.S.C.A. §
2254(d) (Law Co-op. 1992 & Supp. 1997), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214; Respondent's
Brief, supra note 151, at *13. For the text of section 2254, see supra note 110.
248. See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1975.
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landscape" surrounding the Simmons issue, to determine whether the
law required the parole-ineligible jury instruction that O'Dell
requested. 24 9 When deciding Simmons in 1988, the Court relied on
251 while also
Gardner v. Florida,2' 5 and Skipper v. South Carolina,
252 persuasive in reaching its decision. 253
finding California v. Ramos
Importantly, those cases produced an assortment of differing opinions
from the justices,' making the outcomes of those cases "susceptible
or jurists., 255 Thus, from
to debate among reasonable minds ...
these varying opinions alone, it appears that the rule in Simmons was
not definitively dictated by existing precedent, and was therefore, a
new rule.'
In addition to the "mixed signals" extending from the justices'
differing opinions that a jurist confronts upon examining these
cases, 257 the controlling opinions of these cases are also generally
narrow and somewhat fact-specific.25 The opinions are not easily
translated into broad holdings that a jurist could apply to other cases
259
that differ factually from Gardner,Skipper, Ramos, and Caldwell.
Consequently, even a surface examination of these cases' holdings and
opinions supports the majority's ruling that the Simmons rule is new
under Teague.
Admittedly Gardner,holding that the Eighth Amendment precludes
the examination of secret information in sentencing a defendant to
249. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); Caldwell v. Mississippi,
472 U.S. 320 (1985); California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992 (1983); Gardner v. Florida,
430 U.S. 349 (1997).
250. See supra notes 71-78 and accompanying text.
25 1. See supra notes 81-84 and accompanying text (explaining the facts and analysis
in Skipper).
252. See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
253. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-66 (1994).
254. Gardner produced seven separate opinions. See supra note 76. In Skipper, six
Justices constituted the majority while three others joined in a concurrence. See
Skipper, 476 U.S. at 9. In Ramos, five justices made up the majority, two Justices filed
dissenting opinions, one Justice joined a dissent, and another Justice joined a
dissenting opinion in part and also wrote a separate dissenting opinion. See Ramos,
463 U.S. at 994. Finally, the Caldwell Court produced a five-member majority, a
separate concurrence, and a three-member dissent. See Caldwell, 472 U.S. at 322.
255. Supra text accompanying notes 244-45; see also supra note 254 (surveying the
differing opinions in Gardner, Skipper, Ramos, and Caldwell).
256. See supra note 249.
257. See generally Respondent's Brief, supra note 151, at *17 (noting that Gardner,
Skipper, Ramos, and Caldwell contained "no fewer than sixteen separate opinions").
258. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1976 (1997).
259. See supra note 254 (surveying the differing opinions in Gardner, Skipper,
Ramos, and Caldwell).

19981

O'Dell v. Netherland

979

death, 26' and Skipper, holding that a defendant must be allowed to
introduce mitigating evidence of his good behavior in prison if the
prosecutor argues his future dangerousness, 26' lend support to the idea
that the Simmons rule is not new. Like Simmons, both of these cases
262
corrected unconstitutional procedures at the states' penalty trials.
However, both the controlling opinion in Gardnerand the majority
opinion in Skipper were decided on Eighth Amendment grounds,
rather than the due process grounds on which Simmons was
decided. 2' This fact is significant because Gardnerand Skipper did
not rely on the same constitutional analysis on which Simmons relied.
Therefore, the dissent in O'Dell was forced to focus on a footnote in
Skipper which states that, in accordance with due process, a defendant
must not receive the death penalty "on the basis of information which
he had no opportunity to deny or explain.,, 2 ' Thus, looking only at
Gardnerand Skipper, a reasonable jurist may have concluded that the
rule in Simmons was not new.265
However, upon examining Ramos and Caldwell, a reasonable jurist
would have encountered conflicting authority on the issue of what
266
must be disclosed to a jury during death sentencing procedures.
Ramos stands for the proposition that the Court will defer to the states'
judgment regarding what information must be disclosed to a jury when
deciding whether to sentence a defendant to death.267 In fact, both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Ramos specifically approved the
prevailing practice of prohibiting jury consideration of a defendant's
possibility of parole. 268 Thus, the O'Dell majority was correct in
260. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 364 (1977) (White, J., concurring).
Justice White's narrow concurrence constitutes the "rule" in Gardner. See supra note 77.
261. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 8 (1986).
262. See id. at 2; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 351-52. See generally O'Dell v. Netherland,
95 F.3d 1214, 1225 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (summarizing the issues in Gardner and
Skipper), cert. granted in part, 117 S.Ct. 631 (1996), aff'd, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997).
263. See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4-5; Gardner, 430 U.S. at 363-64. See generally
O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1975 (setting forth petitioner's argument that Simmons relied on
Gardner and Skipper).
264. See O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1982 (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1). The
majority in Skipper extracted that language directly from Gardner's plurality opinion.
See Skipper, 476 U.S. at 5 n.1 (quoting Gardner, 430 U.S. at 362).
265. See O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1225.
266. See id. at 1231 (stating "[a] reasonable jurist in 1988, thus, would have found
himself in something of a quandary").
267. See Ramos, 463 U.S. at 999-1014.
268. See id. at 1013 n.30; see also O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1227-28. "[N]ot only the
majority, but the full Court, recognized and approved, as constitutionally permissible,
the practice of nearly every jurisdiction which has considered the question of not
lpermitt[ing][juries]to consider commutation and parole."' Id. (quoting California v.
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concluding that Simmons essentially carved out an exception to
Ramos' rule of general deference to state decisions on jury education
in capital sentencing proceedings. 2 69 This assertion suggests that
Simmons is a new rule.27 Caldwell also supports the proposition that
states can decide what information to disclose to jurors in sentencing
" ' Thus, viewing the legal landscape at the time O'Dell's
procedures.27
conviction became final, a reasonable jurist could have concluded that
the Simmons rule was not constitutionally mandated, and was possibly
even prohibited, since the decision in Simmons to allow information
regarding the defendant's parole ineligibility was not left to the states'
discretion.272
Moreover, the O'Dell dissent incorrectly stated that Ramos and
Caldwell "[slimply provide further support for the conclusion that
Simmons did not announce a new rule of law." 273 Although correct in
concluding that Ramos did not mandate a state to inform sentencing
juries about specific information,274 the dissent missed the point. The
test is what a reasonable jurist would have concluded in viewing the
existing precedent at the time O'Dell's conviction became final.
In
viewing Ramos and Caldwell, a reasonable jurist would have
concluded that the Court had deferred to the states' judgment 2 in
76
deciding what information to disclose to sentencing juries.
Apparently, many jurists concluded just that. 277 The dissent failed to
recognize that even the Simmons plurality had conceded that those
states that opted not to inform their sentencing juries of a defendant's

Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1025 (1983)).
269. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1977.
270. See id.; see also id. at 1975-76 n.2 (stating that although the language in
Simmons plurality opinion is "evidence tending to prove that the rule of Simmons was
not new ... it is far from conclusive").
271. Justice O'Connor's controlling opinion in Ramos concluded that a state could
choose whether or not to "'instruc[t] the jurors on the sentencing procedure, including
the existence and limited nature of appellate review,' so long as any information it
chose to provide was accurate." Id. (quoting Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 342
(1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)).
272. See O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1231-32.
273. O'Dell, 117 S.Ct. at 1983 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
274. The specific information in that case involved informing the jury of the
governor's ability to change a defendant's life sentence without parole to a life sentence
with parole. See California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 995 (1983).
275. See supra note 246 and accompanying text.
276. See supra Part 1I.B.3 (discussing the Court's decisions in Ramos and Caldwell).
277. See O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1233; Ramos, 463 U.S. at 1014 n.30. The Ramos Court
cited several state courts that prohibited jury consideration of a defendant's possible
parole. See id.
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parole ineligibility had relied on Ramos as authority. 8 If several
states believed that Ramos provided them with the discretion to decide
whether or not to educate juries on parole information, then it is not
unreasonable to believe that the failure to extend the Simmons rule to
defendants in 1988 was constitutional. 79
Further, the O'Dell dissent criticized the majority for factually
distinguishing Simmons from Skipper.' ° The dissent then proceeded
to distinguish, on factual grounds, Simmons from Caldwell.2 8' If
both the majority and dissenting justices wished to distinguish
Simmons' precedent on factual grounds, then clearly Ramos serves as
the case most factually akin to Simmons since it specifically discusses
instructing sentencing juries on a defendant's parole possibilities.'
In light of the complex and conflicting legal landscape in 1988, the
variety of justices' opinions surrounding jury education in sentencing
proceedings, as well as the tension between Gardner/Skipper 3 and
Ramos/Caldwell,"4 it would not have been unreasonable for a jurist to
conclude that the Constitution does not require that O'Dell be permitted
to inform a jury of his ineligibility of parole. Further, Ramos certainly
addresses the Simmons issue more directly than Skipper, given
Ramos' factual similarities to Simmons.' Regardless, the conflicting
278. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 167-68 (1994) (stating that
"[tihe few States that do not provide capital sentencing juries with any information
regarding parole ineligibility seem to rely, as South Carolina does here, on the
proposition that California v. Ramos held that such determinations are purely matters of
state law") (citations omitted).
279. See O'Dell, 95 F.3d at 1235.
280. See O'Dell v Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1983 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). Justice Stevens concluded that "the only distinction the majority is able to
draw between [Skipper] and Simmons is that the defendant in Skipper sought to
introduce 'evidence of his past behavior' while Simmons wished 'an opportunity to
describe the extant legal regime' . . . [tihis distinction is simply not enough to make the
rule in Simmons 'new."' Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
281. See id. at 1983-84 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating "[alpart from the fact that
an instruction describing a sentencing alternative does not relate to 'postsentence
procedures,' I see no basis for assuming that concerns about describing the process of
appellate review to a jury might have anything to do with the necessity for providing
the jury with accurate information about sentencing options .... "). The majority relied
on Caldwell to support its proposition that the rule in Simmons was new. See supra
notes 186-93 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text (discussing Ramos).
283. See generally supra notes 71-84 and accompanying text (discussing the
constitutionality of procedures that allow death sentences to be decided based on
evidence not fully disclosed to the defendant or which deny the sentencing jury access to
relevant information).
284. See generally supra notes 85-95 and accompanying text (discussing how the
Court left the question of jury instruction as to post-sentencing laws to the states).
285. The only support for the idea that due process, rather than the Eighth
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authority alone mandates that, whatever a jurist would have concluded
in 1988-whether the jurist believed that Gardner/Skippercontrolled
Simmons more directly than Ramos/Caldwell, or vice versa-the
'
conclusion could not be deemed "unreasonable."286
Thus, it would
not have been objectively unreasonable for a jurist not to extend 2the
7
Simmons rule to O'Dell at the time O'Dell's sentence became final.
B. The Simmons Rule Qualifies Under Teague's Second Exception
Regardless of whether Simmons is or is not a new rule, the majority
should have applied it in O'Dell's case because it falls under Teague's
second exception. As it stands, Teague's second exception allows the
retroactive application of "watershed rules of criminal procedure" or
"bedrock procedural elements" that improve accuracy and implement
fundamental fairness in criminal proceedings. 288 This second
exception will only be extended to those procedures that are likely to
have a serious effect on the accuracy of the conviction. 289 This
standard is certainly difficult to meet, especially in light of the fact that
the Court cites Gideon's right to counsel as an example of the type of
rule that would fall within the exception. 2' Further, since Teague, no
Supreme Court case has ever found a rule to qualify under Teague's
second exception.29'

Amendment, required the Simmons rule lies in a mere footnote in Skipper's majority
opinion. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.l (1985). As the Chief Justice
stated, "[a footnote is] a strange place to find doctrine." Transcript of Oral Arg. at *5,
O'Dell v. Netherland, 1997 WL 136241 (March 18, 1997) (No. 96-6867). However, it
is significant to note that both the plurality in Simmons and Justice O'Connor's
concurrence cited to this footnote in the text of their Simmons' opinions. See Simmons
v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 164, 175 (1994).
286. See O'Dell, 95 F.3d 1214, 1225, 1236-38 (4th Cir. 1996), cert. granted in part,
117 S.Ct. 631 (1996), aft'd, 117 S.Ct. 1969 (1997).
287. See id. at 1238.
288. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 311, 315 (1989); see also supra Part II.C.2.b
(discussing Teague's second exception).
289. See Teague, 489 U.S. at 313. The Court stated: "Finally we believe that Justice
Harlan's concerns about the difficulty in identifying both the existence and the value of
accuracy-enhancing procedural rules can be addressed by limiting the scope of the second
exception to those new procedures without which the likelihood of an accurate
conviction is seriously diminished." Id.
290. See supra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (discussing defendant's
affirmative right to counsel in felony cases).
291. See supra notes 140-44 and accompanying text; see also Teague, 489 U.S. at
313 (noting the unlikeliness of emergence of many components of basic due process
that would meet Teague's second exception).
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1. The Right to Rebut as a Hallmark of Due Process
Nevertheless, like the affirmative right to counsel in felony cases,
one of the "hallmarks of due process" is a defendant's right to rebut
the prosecution's case against him. 2 Arguably, little else could be
more "bedrock" or "fundamental to the fairness" of a criminal
proceeding.293 The justice system is premised on the notion that,
when two sides zealously advocate with a referee ensuring that a jury
hears only relevant, accurate and not unduly prejudicial information,
the truth will emerge. 29 However, because the system is not perfect,
courts must step in to insure the system's accuracy, particularly in
criminal, and more importantly, in death penalty cases. 295 The
Simmons rule upholds a defendant's ability to rebut the prosecution's
case against him. 296 In capital cases, where the issue is literally a
matter of life or death, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the jury
be permitted to hear all relevant and mitigating evidence. 297 In doing
so, the Court has stressed the importance of ensuring the accuracy of
death sentence proceedings. 298
2. Accuracy of Sentencing
Of significance is the effect of the Simmons rule on juries, an effect
that the O'Dell majority fails to even consider. 29 Studies show that
many jurors believe that a defendant sentenced to life imprisonment
will be back on the streets in about ten years, and that a life-sentence
292. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 175 (1994) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring) (stating that "one of the hallmarks of due process in our adversary system is
the defendant's ability to meet the State's case against him") (citing Crane v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 683, 690 (1986)); see also O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1980
(1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). Several other rules have been considered hallmarks of
due process. See Moody v. Miller, 864 F.2d 1178, 1180 (5th Cir. 1989) (stating that
notice, the right of an arrestee to submit a written statement, the right to be represented
by counsel, and the right to call witnesses are hallmarks of due process); Patterson v.
Ramsey, 413 F. Supp. 523, 535-36 (D. Md. 1976) (characterizing notice and
specification of charges, opportunity to be heard and to confront accusers, and an
impartial tribunal as "ingredients of due process"), aff'd, 552 F.2d 117 (4th Cir. 1977).
293. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1980 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
294. See Kenneth J. Drexler, Honest Attorneys, Crooked Clients and Innocent Third
Parties:A Case for More Disclosure,6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 393, 396 n. 12 (1992).
295. See supra Part II.A. I (discussing the Supreme Court's imposition of procedural
and substantive safeguards on death penalty state statutes in the 1970s and 1980s).
296. See Simmons, 512 U.S. at 177 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
297. See, e.g., Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604-08 (1978); see also supra note 55
and accompanying text (discussing the procedural safeguards in sentencing with regard
to the introduction of a defendant's mitigating and aggravating factors).
298. See Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605.
299. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1981 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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essentially constitutes a "get out of jail free" card."° Those jurors will
inevitably be more apt to impose the death penalty, particularly where a
prosecutor argues the defendant's future dangerousness.3 0 ' As a
result, if a juror was informed that a defendant's only alternative to
death is life withoutparole, the result would be much more reliable and
accurate. 0 2
Prior to Simmons, a majority of states recognized the importance of
providing juries with the life-without-parole alternative, and required
that information regarding this sentencing option be provided to the
jury.303 For example, in Virginia, the state in which O'Dell was
sentenced, the number of death sentences imposed by capital juries
decreased significantly after Virginia implemented the requirement that
juries be instructed on the life-without-parole alternative.' The effect
of the Simmons rule on juries suggests that the rule is fundamental to
the fairness of a criminal proceeding. In failing to qualify Simmons
under Teague's second exception, the Court stepped away from its
history of treating capital punishment cases "differently" and of
requiring a heightened level of scrutiny in death penalty reviews. 305

300. See Cooper, supra note 98, at 1573 n.2 (citing William M. Hood, III, Note, The
Meaning of "Life" for Virginia Jurors and Its Effect on Reliability in Capital
Sentencing, 75 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1606, 1620-25 (1989); Anthony Paduano & Clive A.
Stafford Smith, Deathly Errors: Juror Misperceptions Concerning Parole in the
Imposition of the Death Penalty, 18 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 211, 211-14 (1987));
see also Mary Zaug, Note, Simmons v. South Carolina: Safeguarding a Capital
Defendant's Right to Fair Sentencing Proceeding, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 511, 544 n.211
(1995) (citing Theodore Eisenberg and Martin T. Wells, Deadly Confusion: Jury
Instructions in Capital Cases, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1993)).
301. See O'Dell, 117 S. Ct. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
302. See id. at 1981 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "the likelihood that a jury
would find an obviously guilty defendant eligible for the death penalty was significantly
increased when an arguably more appropriate sentencing alternative was not available").
303. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
304. See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that "[olnly two death sentences have
been imposed in Virginia for crimes committed after January 1, 1995-whereas ten were
imposed in 1994 alone-and the decline in the number of death sentences has been
attributed to the fact that juries in Virginia must now be informed of the life-withoutparole alternative") (citing Frank Green, Death Sentences Decline in Virginia-Life Term
Without Parole is Factor in Change, RICHMOND TIMEs-DISPATCH, Nov. 24, 1996, at Al).
305. See Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 505 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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C. Death Is Different
Death is different. 306 In a majority of Supreme Court cases
involving capital punishment, justices recognize that no punishment,
even a life sentence, equates in gravity to the death penalty. 30 7 The
O'Dell Court failed to adhere to this precedent when it refused to place
the Simmons rule within Teague's second exception.
The justifications for the Teague doctrine are generally sound. 08
The doctrine promotes finality of decisions, which is crucial to the
proper functioning of the criminal justice system,3 "9 and it limits the
excessive costs of retroactive application of new rules that often
outweigh the advantages of such application. 30 Finally, the doctrine
encourages lower courts to have the confidence to apply the current
law, rather than forcing them to anticipate future changes in the law. 31,
However, these many justifications for Teague become less
convincing where the penalty is death.312
As recognized by the justices, because death is "qualitatively
different" from any other sentence, procedures in capital sentencing are
of paramount importance.313 The sentence "should reflect a reasoned
moral response to the defendant's background, character, and
crime. ,3 " Thus, whether one agrees or disagrees with the death
penalty on a personal level, one cannot deny that a death sentence
306. See, e.g., Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 516 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 468 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). Justice Stevens stated:
[E]very member of this Court has written or joined at least one opinion
endorsing the proposition that because of its severity and irrevocability, the
death penalty is qualitatively different from any other punishment, and hence
must be accompanied by unique safeguards to ensure that it is a justified
response to a given offense.
Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 468; see also Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 185
(1994) (discussing the "death-is-different jurisprudence").
307. See Harris, 513 U.S. at 516 n.1 (listing several Supreme Court cases that have
stressed the notion that "death is a fundamentally different kind of penalty").
308. See Metzner, supra note 108, at 183-84.
309. See id. at 188-89.
310. See id.
311. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 308-09 (1989).
312. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 341 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (stating "a person may be killed although he or she has a
sound constitutional claim that would have barred his or her execution had this Court
only announced the constitutional rule before his or her conviction and sentence became
final"); Cooper, supra note 98, at 1602.
313. See supra notes 306-07 and accompanying text.
314. See California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 545 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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should meet every Constitutional safeguard in order to ensure the
accuracy of the sentence. 1 5 Yet, under the O'Dell Court's limited
reading of Teague's second exception, the Court essentially holds that,
despite the fact that O'Dell's sentence was unconstitutional, unfair, and
based on misleading information, it should not be "upset" because it
was finalized before Simmons.1 6 As Justice Brennan stated, "[Tihe
difference between life and death should [not] turn on such a fortuity
of timing .
,,317
V. IMPACT
The O'Dell Court's determination that Simmons is a new rule will
lead to some future favorable results in that it will allow lower courts
to confidently apply existing law to cases before them. Courts will no
longer be forced to predict the future actions of the Supreme Court,
rather, they will be able to focus on existing precedent, providing
consistency and certainty in the varying and changing course of case
law.' 38
Despite this one positive outcome of precedent, the Court's refusal
to apply Teague's second exception to Simmons will detrimentally
impact future capital defendants by upholding death sentences imposed
by procedures which are later deemed unconstitutional. This is
extremely problematic given that life is at stake.
Historically, the Court has recognized the fundamental difference
between capital and non-capital cases, and has appropriately mandated
that stricter procedural requirements be followed in death sentencing
cases. 319 In fact, one could argue that any defect in a death sentencing
procedure that results in a constitutional error should be considered
fundamental or "bedrock," given the permanent and controversial
nature of the death penalty. 320 Yet, the Court continues to hastily
315. See Metzner, supra note 108, at 183 (stating that the death penalty "[sihould be
imposed only when the state has complied with every procedural requirement of the
Constitution").
316. See O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S. Ct. 1969, 1980 (1997) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
317. Penry, 492 U.S. at 341 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan, in Penry
further stated that it was "[b]eyond my comprehension that a majority of this Court will
so blithely allow a State to take a human life though the method by which sentence was
determined violates our Constitution." Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3 18. See Metzner, supra note 108, at 186-87.
3 19. See supra Part II.A. I (describing the Court's imposition of strict substantive
and procedural requirements on state death penalty statutes).
320. See generally Metzner, supra note 108, at 183. (stating that "it offends all core
notions of civilization ... to execute a person ... because the powers that be did not
determine the existence of its prejudicial nature until after the defendant had crossed the
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extend the Teague doctrine in its totality to capital cases without
holding to its tradition of treating capital and noncapital cases
differently. 321 In order to live with the idea that a human being will be
killed under a jury's instruction, it is necessary to ensure that the
decision to sentence another to death is the right one. Accordingly, the
restrictive definition that the Supreme Court provides for the second
exception to Teague should be modified to allow for a more lenient
application of this exception in capital cases. 32
In O'Dell, the Court should have qualified O'Dell's claim under the
second exception to Teague. If the Court continues to construe the
second exception so narrowly, it appears that no habeas petitioner will
ever be permitted to retroactively apply a new rule, even if that new
rule establishes that the petitioner's sentencing hearing was unfair or
unconstitutional. 32 As it stands, the Court will uphold the utmost
punishment on a person even where that punishment admittedly does
not satisfy procedural safeguards. 324 Such a result is not compatible
with the goals of our justice system. Therefore, when determining
whether a new rule should qualify under the second exception to
Teague, courts should adopt a more lenient application of Teague's
second exception for capital cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in O'Dell v. Netherland promotes
expediency in post-sentencing appeals over Constitutional guarantees
that ensure a defendant's right to a fair and accurate capital sentencing
proceeding. Although the Court correctly held that Simmons v. South
Rubicon").
321. See, e.g., Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484 (1980); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S.
407 (1990); Penry, 492 U.S. at 302.
322. See Metzner, supra note 108, at 184-85; see also Saffle, 494 U.S. at 505
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissent stated:
The determination with which the Court refuses to apply [Teague's second]
exception to a capital sentencing error is most disturbing and is remarkably
insensitive to the fundamental premise upon which our Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence is built. This Court has consistently 'recognized that the
qualitative difference of death from all other punishments requires a
correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny of the capital sentencing
determination.' If the irrevocable nature of the death penalty is not sufficient
to counsel against application of Justice Harlan's doctrine of limited
retroactivity for collateral review altogether, it should at least inform the
determination of the proper scope of the second Teague exception in capital
cases.
Saffle, at 505-06 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (citations omitted).
323 See Saffle, 494 U.S. at 505-06.
324 See O'Dell v. Netherland, 117 S.Ct. 1969, 1979 (1997) (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
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Carolinaconstitutes a new rule for purposes of the Teague doctrine,
the Court inappropriately concluded that a criminal defendant's right to
meet a state's case against him was not a "bedrock element of
fundamental fairness." By failing to allow a broader definition of
Teague's second exception for capital punishment appeals, the Court
continues to stray from its historical practice of recognizing that "death
is different" from any other sentence. Instead, the Court's decision to
uphold an admittedly unfair and inaccurate sentence on the basis of its
timing violates the criminal system's traditional notions of justice.
JOANNE T. HANNAWAY

